Corollary 4 — acquihiring is more efficient iff v_a > v_s + (4/5)B; chosen direct hiring is efficient, chosen acquihiring may not be
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo.corollary_4acquihiringp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1private-informationwelfare
In the private-benefit model of §6 (, , ), let be expected total surplus under direct hiring at Lemma 5's equilibrium wages and the surplus with the employee at the acquirer. Let . Then:
- if , then (acquihiring is more efficient);
- if , then (direct hiring is more efficient);
- whenever direct hiring occurs (), it is more efficient: ;
- if
the acquirer's direct-hiring profit is strictly below its acquihiring profit (acquihiring occurs in equilibrium) and yet .
Together with Proposition 5, this says that equilibrium acquihiring can be socially excessive while equilibrium direct hiring never is.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_PrivateInfo_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
theorem corollary_4 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(P.vs + 4 / 5 * P.B < P.va → welfareDH P < welfareAH P) ∧
(P.va < P.vs + 4 / 5 * P.B → welfareAH P < welfareDH P) ∧
(P.va < vHat P → welfareAH P < welfareDH P) ∧
((7 - 3 * Real.sqrt 5) / 2 < (P.va - P.vs) / P.B → (P.va - P.vs) / P.B < 4 / 5 →
profitA P (waStar P) (wsStar P) < ahProfitA P ∧ welfareAH P < welfareDH P) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 17 (PDF 18), Corollary 4
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.