Pricing Inequality, §3.1, p. 9 — F̄(x) ≤ R_SP(F,0)/x for every x > 0
ProvedValuePersPricing.Deviation.pricing_inequalitymonopoly-pricingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1personalized-pricing
Let be a valuation with almost surely and finite mean, and let the cost be . For every price ,
where and .
The optimal single-price revenue thus controls the tail of the valuation distribution; this pointwise bound drives all the upper bounds of the paper.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: V ∼ F nonnegative with cost 0 → a probability measure ν on ℝ with Market ν 0 (V ≥ 0 a.s., E|V| < ∞); reason: standing assumptions of §2.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ValuePersPricing_Deviation_Model open MeasureTheory Set Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ValuePersPricing.Deviation
/-- The Pricing Inequality (§3.1, p. 9): with zero cost, `F̄(x) ≤ R_SP(F, 0)/x` for every `x > 0`. -/
theorem pricing_inequality (ν : Measure ℝ) (hm : Market ν 0) :
∀ x : ℝ, 0 < x → tail ν x ≤ spProfit ν 0 / x := by sorry
end ValuePersPricing.Deviation
Source
Elmachtoub, Gupta & Hamilton, The Value of Personalized Pricing, SSRN 3127719 (review version, PDF sha256 635e22eb…), p. 9 (PDF 9), §3.1, Pricing Inequality
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.