Table 3 (2nd column), p. 16 (PDF 16) — the no-promotion equilibrium
ProvedBOGOPromo.NoStockpile.np_equilibriumdouble-marginalizationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1stackelberg-gamesupply-chain
Let the unit production cost satisfy and consider the game in which the retailer can only set a single price. An equilibrium (manufacturer leading, retailer best-responding at every wholesale price in ) exists, and in every equilibrium
This is the benchmark against which Corollary 4 compares the BOGO and PR outcomes.
Formalization Note The page allows ; the case is excluded. There the manufacturer's profit forces , but at every retail price is a best response (profit ), so the retail price of the table is one equilibrium outcome, not the only one.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BOGOPromo_NoStockpile_Model
Formal statement
namespace BOGOPromo.NoStockpile
theorem np_equilibrium (c : ℝ) (hc0 : 0 ≤ c) (hc1 : c < 1) :
(∃ (w : ℝ) (r : ℝ → ℝ), IsEqN c w r) ∧
∀ (w : ℝ) (r : ℝ → ℝ), IsEqN c w r →
w = (1 + c) / 2 ∧ r w = (3 + c) / 4 ∧ npDemand (r w) = (1 - c) / 2 ∧
npProfit w (r w) = (1 - c) ^ 2 / 8 ∧ (w - c) * npDemand (r w) = (1 - c) ^ 2 / 4 := by sorry
end BOGOPromo.NoStockpile
Source
Li, Khouja, Pan & Zhou, Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain, SSRN working paper 3561162, p. 16 (PDF 16), Table 3 (2nd column, No Promotion)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.