Proof of Proposition 2, Step 1, oa6 (PDF 38) — the all-minimum path attains the minimum profit (25) in every subgame along it
ProvedAssemblyCoord.Feedback.prop_2_step1_min_profitIn the -contractor, -period coordination game with information feedback started from zero effort, under the standing assumptions, let be any strategy profile along whose path every contractor exerts in every period. Let be the history of the first periods of that path, . Then for every subgame-perfect equilibrium and every contractor ,
where denotes the final effort levels when is played from history to the end of period .
In words: continuing the all-minimum path gives every contractor the lowest profit among all SPE continuations of the subgame, which is condition (25) of the paper for this path. It is the step from "SPE" to "SPSE" in the existence half of Proposition 2(i).
Formalization Note. Neither nor that is an SPE is needed, and neither is assumed. Periods are 0-based (pathHist σ n).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AssemblyCoord_Feedback_Model
namespace AssemblyCoord.Feedback
theorem prop_2_step1_min_profit (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (σ : Profile P.M)
(hpath : ∀ n, n < P.N → ∀ i : Fin P.M, σ i (pathHist σ n) = P.qlo / P.N) :
∀ n, n < P.N → ∀ σ' : Profile P.M, P.IsSPE 0 σ' → ∀ i : Fin P.M,
P.profit (P.final 0 σ (pathHist σ n)) i ≤ P.profit (P.final 0 σ' (pathHist σ n)) i := by sorry
end AssemblyCoord.Feedback
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.