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Theorem 3.5 — Quantitative generic security

Proved
GenericGroupWE.Main.theorem_3_5

by mikedeng1 · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

complexity-theorycryptographygeneric-groupsp2o-batch-stoc27ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

There is an absolute positive constant CCC with the following property. Let n≥2n\ge2n≥2, m≥16nm\ge16nm≥16n, let 2m≤p<2m+12^m\le p<2^{m+1}2m≤p<2m+1 be prime, and let a linearly independent matrix basis have every nonzero combination of rank at least RRR. Every classical generic adversary making at most QQQ calls satisfies

Adv⁡A≤C(Q+m+k)2(m−R+p−1).\operatorname{Adv}_A\le C(Q+m+k)^2(m^{-R}+p^{-1}).AdvA​≤C(Q+m+k)2(m−R+p−1).

This holds both for the exact law conditional on successful sampling and for the bounded law including common abort. The adversary may inspect all exposed strings, perform arbitrary local computation, and make arbitrary-string queries. The same constant precedes all parameters.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: a fixed false statement producing the rank-gap space → any matrix family satisfying the same independence and rank assumptions; reason: the generic argument depends only on these algebraic properties
  • encoding: big-O with an absolute hidden constant → one positive constant C before n,m,p,basis,R,Q and adversary; reason: the quantitative and uniform content of the bound is unchanged
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_GenericGroupWE_Main_Scheme
Formal statement
namespace GenericGroupWE.Main
open scoped BigOperators

theorem theorem_3_5 :
    ∃ C : ℝ, 0 < C ∧ ∀ (n m : ℕ), 2 ≤ n → 16*n ≤ m →
      ∀ (p : PrimeOrder), 2^m ≤ p.val → p.val < 2^(m+1) →
      ∀ (B : MatrixBundle m p), LinearIndependent (ZMod p.val) B.matrices →
      ∀ R : ℝ,
        (∀ a : Fin B.k → ZMod p.val, B.combination a ≠ 0 → R ≤ (B.combination a).rank) →
        ∀ (Q : ℕ) (A : Adversary Q) (conditional : Bool) (hm : 0 < m),
          schemeAdvantage B n A conditional hm ≤
            C * (Q + m + B.k : ℝ)^2 * ((m : ℝ)^(-R) + (p.val : ℝ)⁻¹) := by sorry

end GenericGroupWE.Main
Source
Hair and Sahai, Witness Encryption via Prime-Order Generic Groups, STOC 2027 submission #47 (PDF built 2026-11-02; SHA-256 0b7f14e2db9bb3e199883ab907f854b7b5884c7c9f3d1e4c306bb71e89b659cb), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/47.pdf, Theorem 3.5, PDF p. 10 (printed p. 9).
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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