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(2), PDF p. 3 — c_i^j = w_i + Σ_{k≠i} p_k^j w_k = M^j + (1 − p_i^j) w_i

Proved
WorstCaseEq.Identical.eq2_linkCost

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

load-balancingmixed-strategiesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let nnn agents with traffics w1,…,wnw_1,\dots,w_nw1​,…,wn​ share mmm identical links, and let p=(pij)p=(p_i^j)p=(pij​) be a mixed profile: each (pi1,…,pim)(p_i^1,\dots,p_i^m)(pi1​,…,pim​) is a probability distribution on the links. Write Mj=∑ipijwiM^j=\sum_i p_i^j w_iMj=∑i​pij​wi​ for the expected traffic on link jjj.

Fix an agent iii and a link jjj, and suppose agent iii sends its traffic on link jjj with certainty while every other agent keeps its mixed strategy. Then the expected cost of agent iii (the expected traffic on link jjj) is

cij=wi+∑k≠ipkjwk=Mj+(1−pij) wi.c_i^j=w_i+\sum_{k\neq i}p_k^j w_k = M^j+(1-p_i^j)\,w_i .cij​=wi​+k=i∑​pkj​wk​=Mj+(1−pij​)wi​.

This is equation (2) of the paper. It turns the expected cost of a pure deviation into a closed form that is linear in the other agents' probabilities, and it is the starting point of the equilibrium characterization and of Theorem 2.

Formalization Note The first equality is stated for the expected cost in the profile in which agent iii's strategy is replaced by the point mass on jjj; the second equality is an algebraic identity. No sign condition on the traffics is needed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_WorstCaseEq_Identical_Model
Formal statement
namespace WorstCaseEq.Identical

/-- (2), PDF p. 3: for a mixed profile `p`, the expected cost of agent `i` when its own traffic is
assigned to link `j` (the others keeping their lotteries) is `c_i^j = w_i + ∑_{k ≠ i} p_k^j w_k`, and
`c_i^j = M^j + (1 - p_i^j) w_i`. -/
theorem eq2_linkCost {n m : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (p : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ)
    (hp : AGT.IsMixedProfile (S := fun _ : Fin n => Fin m) p) :
    ∀ i j, -AGT.expectedPayoff (S := fun _ : Fin n => Fin m) (payoff w)
        (Function.update p i (pureLottery j)) i = linkCost w p i j ∧
      linkCost w p i j = expTraffic w p j + (1 - p i j) * w i := by sorry

end WorstCaseEq.Identical
Source
Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria (journal version, 2009), PDF p. 3, (2)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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