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p. 11 — a profile is a Nash equilibrium iff no switch to a pure strategy pays

Proved
FixpNash.DivFree.isMixedNash_iff_purePayoff_le

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

In a finite game, a profile x∗x^*x∗ is a Nash equilibrium when it is a mixed strategy profile and, for every player iii and every mixed strategy yiy_iyi​ of player iii, ui(x∗)≥ui(yi;x−i∗)u_i(x^*)\ge u_i(y_i;x^*_{-i})ui​(x∗)≥ui​(yi​;x−i∗​). It suffices to check switches to pure strategies only:

x∗ is a Nash equilibrium  ⟺  x∗∈Δ  and  ui((i:j);x−i∗)≤ui(x∗)  for every player i and every j∈Si.x^*\text{ is a Nash equilibrium}\iff x^*\in\Delta\ \text{ and }\ u_i((i{:}j);x^*_{-i})\le u_i(x^*)\ \text{ for every player } i \text{ and every } j\in S_i .x∗ is a Nash equilibrium⟺x∗∈Δ  and  ui​((i:j);x−i∗​)≤ui​(x∗)  for every player i and every j∈Si​.

Here ui(x∗)u_i(x^*)ui​(x∗) is player iii's expected payoff and ui((i:j);x−i∗)u_i((i{:}j);x^*_{-i})ui​((i:j);x−i∗​) the expected payoff when iii switches to the pure strategy jjj while the others keep x∗x^*x∗.

This is the test used in both directions of the characterization of Nash equilibria as fixed points of GIG_IGI​.

Formalization Note. Both sides require x∗x^*x∗ to be a mixed profile; the paper's "x∗ is a NE iff …" ranges over strategy profiles. The definition of Nash equilibrium is the published AGT.IsMixedNash (deviations to arbitrary lotteries).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_DivFree_Map
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.DivFree

/-- p. 11: a mixed profile is a Nash equilibrium iff no player gains by switching to a
pure strategy: `uᵢ(x) ≥ uᵢ((i:j); x₋ᵢ)` for every player `i` and every `j ∈ Sᵢ`. -/
theorem isMixedNash_iff_purePayoff_le {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
    (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) :
    AGT.IsMixedNash u x ↔
      AGT.IsMixedProfile x ∧
        ∀ (i : ι) (j : S i),
          DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j ≤ AGT.expectedPayoff u x i := by sorry

end FixpNash.DivFree
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), Section 2.2, p. 11
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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