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Proposition 1, p. 10 — under strong network effects the stage-2 equilibria are all-buy, none-buy, or both

Proved
NetworkQuality.PotentialMax.proposition_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

coordinationnash-equilibriumnetwork-effectsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

In the network market under the standing assumptions, fix a quality q≥0q\ge 0q≥0 with strong network effects, i.e. v1f(1,q)<v2f(2,q)<⋯<vnf(n,q)v_1f(1,q)<v_2f(2,q)<\dots<v_nf(n,q)v1​f(1,q)<v2​f(2,q)<⋯<vn​f(n,q). Then for every price ppp the (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria B⊆NB\subseteq NB⊆N of the stage-2 subgame are exactly as follows:

  1. if p<v1f(1,q)p<v_1f(1,q)p<v1​f(1,q), the only equilibrium is B=NB=NB=N (all consumers buy);
  2. if p>vnf(n,q)p>v_nf(n,q)p>vn​f(n,q), the only equilibrium is B=∅B=\emptysetB=∅ (no consumer buys);
  3. if v1f(1,q)≤p≤vnf(n,q)v_1f(1,q)\le p\le v_nf(n,q)v1​f(1,q)≤p≤vn​f(n,q), the equilibria are exactly B=NB=NB=N and B=∅B=\emptysetB=∅.

Under strong network effects consumers always coordinate on a common action, and for a range of prices both coordinated outcomes are equilibria; this multiplicity is what makes equilibrium selection matter for the firm.

Formalization Note "Equilibrium" is read as pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of stage 2, identified with the set of buyers, and each case is stated as a characterization of the set of equilibria, which is what the paper's proof establishes. v1v_1v1​ and vnv_nvn​ are the Lean terms M.v ⟨0, _⟩ and M.v ⟨n - 1, _⟩. The hypothesis q≥0q\ge 0q≥0 is the paper's domain of quality.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NetworkQuality_PotentialMax_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NetworkQuality.PotentialMax

open Market

theorem proposition_1 {n : ℕ} (M : Market n) (hM : M.Standing) (q : ℝ) (hq : 0 ≤ q)
    (hs : M.StrongNE q) (p : ℝ) :
    (p < M.v ⟨0, hM.1⟩ * M.f 1 q →
      ∀ B : Finset (Fin n), M.IsNash B p q ↔ B = Finset.univ) ∧
    (M.v ⟨n - 1, Nat.sub_lt hM.1 Nat.one_pos⟩ * M.f n q < p →
      ∀ B : Finset (Fin n), M.IsNash B p q ↔ B = ∅) ∧
    (M.v ⟨0, hM.1⟩ * M.f 1 q ≤ p → p ≤ M.v ⟨n - 1, Nat.sub_lt hM.1 Nat.one_pos⟩ * M.f n q →
      ∀ B : Finset (Fin n), M.IsNash B p q ↔ (B = Finset.univ ∨ B = ∅)) := by sorry

end NetworkQuality.PotentialMax
Source
Chan, Quality Strategies in Network Markets, SSRN 4203818 (version of April 2023), p. 10, Proposition 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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