Proposition 5.6 -- on bounded one-dimensional type spaces with finite A, monotone decision rules are implementable
ProvedMechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat.monotone_implementableincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designone-dimensionalp2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1
Suppose that the set of alternatives is finite, is a complete and transitive order of , and the type set is
- bounded: there is with for all and , and
- one-dimensional with respect to .
Then every decision rule that is monotone with respect to () is implementable: there is such that
Together with Propositions 5.1 and 5.5 this makes monotonicity necessary and sufficient for implementability on such domains, as in the one-dimensional models of Chapters 2–4.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_IncentiveCompat_Model
Formal statement
namespace MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
/-- Proposition 5.6 (p.107): if `A` is finite, `R` is a complete and transitive order of `A`,
and `Θ` is bounded and one-dimensional with respect to `R`, then every decision rule that is
monotone with respect to `R` is implementable. -/
theorem monotone_implementable {A Θ : Type*} [Finite A] [Nonempty Θ] (u : A → Θ → ℝ)
(R : A → A → Prop) (hR : IsCompleteTransitive R) (hbdd : IsBoundedTypeSpace u)
(h1 : OneDimensional u R) (q : Θ → A) (hq : MonotoneWRT u R q) :
Implementable u q := by sorry
end MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
Source
Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001, p.107, Proposition 5.6, Definition 5.9 (p.106)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.