§7, proof of Theorem 7.1 — for a balanced game the canonical cooperative equilibria of V and of πV coincide
ProvedFuzzyGames.NTUCore.cce_eq_piV_ccebalanced-gamescooperative-gamesequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a family of nonempty coalitions of containing and every singleton, and let be a game without side payments on : for every , is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of that is comprehensive and bounded above (§7 (1)). Its fuzzy extension is
where is the set of nonnegative weights on with for every player (§6 (3)–(4), §7 (5)). Assume is balanced, . Then
- the weak canonical cooperative equilibria of the game (§7 (3)) coincide with the weak canonical cooperative equilibria of the fuzzy game (§3 (8));
- the strong canonical cooperative equilibria of coincide with the strong canonical cooperative equilibria of .
This is the fact the proof of Theorem 7.1 combines with Theorem 3.1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic open Set Finset Pointwise
Formal statement
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore
/-- §7, proof of Theorem 7.1 (pp. 9–10): for a balanced game, the weak (resp. strong) canonical
cooperative equilibria of the game `V` and of the fuzzy game `πV` coincide. -/
theorem cce_eq_piV_cce {n : ℕ} (𝒞 : CoalFamily n) {V : Finset (Fin n) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)}
(hV : IsNTUGame 𝒞 V) (hbal : IsBalanced 𝒞 V) :
ntuWeakCCE 𝒞 V = weakCCE (piV 𝒞 V) ∧ ntuStrongCCE 𝒞 V = strongCCE (piV 𝒞 V) := by sorry
end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Source
Aubin, Cooperative Fuzzy Games, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), §7, proof of Theorem 7.1, pp. 9–10
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.