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§7, proof of Theorem 7.1 — for a balanced game the canonical cooperative equilibria of V and of πV coincide

Proved
FuzzyGames.NTUCore.cce_eq_piV_cce

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

balanced-gamescooperative-gamesequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let C\mathcal{C}C be a family of nonempty coalitions of N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} containing NNN and every singleton, and let VVV be a game without side payments on C\mathcal{C}C: for every A∈CA \in \mathcal{C}A∈C, V(A)V(A)V(A) is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of RA\mathbb{R}^ARA that is comprehensive and bounded above (§7 (1)). Its fuzzy extension is

πV(τ)=⋃m∈C(τ)∑A∈Cm(A) V(A),\pi V(\tau) = \bigcup_{m \in \mathcal{C}(\tau)} \sum_{A \in \mathcal{C}} m(A)\, V(A),πV(τ)=m∈C(τ)⋃​A∈C∑​m(A)V(A),

where C(τ)\mathcal{C}(\tau)C(τ) is the set of nonnegative weights mmm on C\mathcal{C}C with ∑A∋im(A)=τi\sum_{A \ni i} m(A) = \tau_i∑A∋i​m(A)=τi​ for every player iii (§6 (3)–(4), §7 (5)). Assume VVV is balanced, V(N)=πV(τN)V(N) = \pi V(\tau^N)V(N)=πV(τN). Then

  1. the weak canonical cooperative equilibria of the game VVV (§7 (3)) coincide with the weak canonical cooperative equilibria of the fuzzy game πV\pi VπV (§3 (8));
  2. the strong canonical cooperative equilibria of VVV coincide with the strong canonical cooperative equilibria of πV\pi VπV.

This is the fact the proof of Theorem 7.1 combines with Theorem 3.1.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic

open Set Finset Pointwise
Formal statement
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore

/-- §7, proof of Theorem 7.1 (pp. 9–10): for a balanced game, the weak (resp. strong) canonical
cooperative equilibria of the game `V` and of the fuzzy game `πV` coincide. -/
theorem cce_eq_piV_cce {n : ℕ} (𝒞 : CoalFamily n) {V : Finset (Fin n) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)}
    (hV : IsNTUGame 𝒞 V) (hbal : IsBalanced 𝒞 V) :
    ntuWeakCCE 𝒞 V = weakCCE (piV 𝒞 V) ∧ ntuStrongCCE 𝒞 V = strongCCE (piV 𝒞 V) := by sorry

end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Source
Aubin, Cooperative Fuzzy Games, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), §7, proof of Theorem 7.1, pp. 9–10
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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