Proposition 2, p. 7 — below the capacity threshold k̲ M enters [v_K, ∞) (Mode I); above it he also enters [v_L, v_T) (Mode II)
ProvedRetailerMarketplace.Entry.proposition_2Let be the unit cost, the ad valorem fee, the share of consumers can steer (Assumption 1), and 's capacity. Let be the distribution of product valuations: a probability measure on with , absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, with , and charging every nonempty open interval of ; . Third-party sellers enter the products with , and chooses an allocation: any measurable set of products with , maximizing his total profit (SBM profits on below , SBMT profits on above , fee revenue on the marketplace products outside ).
Then there is a threshold , namely , such that
- Mode I (): an optimal allocation exists and is unique up to -null sets; it is if and otherwise
so products in are supplied under SBT and products in under SBMT; 2. Mode II (): there are with
such that is an optimal allocation and every optimal allocation equals it up to a -null set; so products in are supplied under SBM, in under SBT, and in under SBMT.
This is the paper's characterization of the two marketplace modes: with little capacity the monopolist competes only in the most valuable marketplace products; with more capacity he also monopolizes products no third party supplies.
Formalization Note Products below are not marketplace products ( stays out), so an allocation avoiding them leaves them unsupplied. is assumed because is finite only then; the foreclosed case is not covered. , integrability of (so that profits are finite) and full support on (the reading of in (3)) are added hypotheses. At , and the optimal allocation is empty. At the Mode II thresholds are , , so the bounds are closed. At , and Mode II is vacuous, as in the paper.
Retired 2026-10-27: a Lean-vs-paper fidelity audit found this statement weaker than, or narrower than, the cited result. A corrected statement will be resubmitted.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_Model open MeasureTheory
namespace RetailerMarketplace.Entry
/-- Proposition 2: there is a capacity threshold `k̲ ∈ [0, 1]` (namely `1 - G(v*)`) such that M's
optimal capacity allocations (unique up to `μ`-null sets) are
1. (Mode I, `k ≤ k̲`) the top products `[v_K, ∞)` with `1 - G(v_K) = k` and `v_K ≥ v_T`, so that
`[v_T, v_K)` is SBT and `[v_K, ∞)` is SBMT (no product at all when `k = 0`);
2. (Mode II, `k > k̲`) `[v_L, v_T) ∪ [v_H, ∞)` with `c ≤ v_L ≤ v_T ≤ v_H`, where `v_L, v_H` equalize
`π_M^SBM(v_L) = Δπ_M^{SBMT-SBT}(v_H)` and use all capacity, so that `[v_L, v_T)` is SBM,
`[v_T, v_H)` is SBT and `[v_H, ∞)` is SBMT. -/
theorem proposition_2 (μ : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (c f lam k : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c)
(hf : f ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1) (hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (1 / 2 : ℝ) 1)
(hk : k ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hsupp : μ (Set.Iio c) = 0) (hac : μ ≪ volume)
(hint : Integrable (fun v : ℝ => v) μ)
(hfull : ∀ a b : ℝ, c ≤ a → a < b → 0 < μ (Set.Ioo a b)) :
∃ k₀ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, k₀ = kbar μ c f lam ∧
(k ≤ k₀ →
∃ U : Set ℝ,
((k = 0 ∧ U = ∅) ∨
∃ vK : ℝ, vT c f ≤ vK ∧ 1 - G μ vK = k ∧ U = Set.Ici vK) ∧
IsOptimalAlloc μ c f lam k U ∧
∀ A : Set ℝ, IsOptimalAlloc μ c f lam k A → A =ᵐ[μ] U) ∧
(k₀ < k →
∃ vL vH : ℝ, c ≤ vL ∧ vL ≤ vT c f ∧ vT c f ≤ vH ∧
piSBM c vL = dPi c f lam vH ∧
(1 - G μ vH) + (G μ (vT c f) - G μ vL) = k ∧
IsOptimalAlloc μ c f lam k (Set.Ico vL (vT c f) ∪ Set.Ici vH) ∧
∀ A : Set ℝ, IsOptimalAlloc μ c f lam k A →
A =ᵐ[μ] (Set.Ico vL (vT c f) ∪ Set.Ici vH : Set ℝ)) := by sorry
end RetailerMarketplace.Entry
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.