Appendix B, proof of Theorem 2, p. 53 — the hard/soft floor mechanism with p = r, s = r + ε is a deterministic ε-IC mechanism
ProvedApproxIC.Deterministic.hardSoft_mem_Mdsetapproximate-incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let the buyer's value have a density on (standing assumptions of §2), let and . Then the hard/soft floor mechanism with hard floor and soft floor ,
is a feasible deterministic mechanism for :
That is, it is measurable, allocates either or , is individually rational, and is -incentive compatible.
In the proof of Theorem 2 this is the step that makes the hard/soft floor family a valid replacement for an arbitrary deterministic -IC mechanism.
Formalization Note For the soft floor lies beyond the support; the mechanism restricted to is still well defined and the statement still holds.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ApproxIC_Deterministic_Setting import Definitions.Def_ApproxIC_Deterministic_HardSoft
Formal statement
namespace ApproxIC.Deterministic
theorem hardSoft_mem_Mdset (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (ε : ℝ) (hε : 0 ≤ ε)
(r : ℝ) (hr : r ∈ Set.Icc 0 M.vbar) :
hardSoft r (r + ε) ∈ Mdset M ε := by sorry
end ApproxIC.Deterministic
Source
Balseiro, Besbes, Castro, Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility, arXiv:2103.03403v2 (2022), p. 53, Appendix B, proof of Theorem 2, second paragraph ("Note that this mechanism is also feasible")
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.