§1.4, eq. (1), p. 4 — under linear inverse demand P_m − bQ the optimal quantity is (P_m − c)/2b and the price is (P_m + c)/2
ProvedLinearPriceRule.Concave.linear_pricelinear-demandmonopolyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing
Let and , and suppose the inverse demand is linear, , so that selling units earns . Then the profit is maximized over uniquely at
This is the source of the pricing rule: the profit-maximizing price under a linear demand does not depend on the slope , so a firm that knows only and can charge (the "linear price") without knowing .
Formalization Note The statement asserts that is a maximizer on , that it is the only one, and the identity for the price. No sign condition on is needed here.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LinearPriceRule_Concave_Model
Formal statement
namespace LinearPriceRule.Concave
theorem linear_price (Pm b c : ℝ) (hb : 0 < b) (hc : c < Pm) :
IsMaxOn (linProfitAt Pm b c) (Set.Ici 0) ((Pm - c) / (2 * b)) ∧
(∀ Q ∈ Set.Ici (0 : ℝ), IsMaxOn (linProfitAt Pm b c) (Set.Ici 0) Q →
Q = (Pm - c) / (2 * b)) ∧
Pm - b * ((Pm - c) / (2 * b)) = (Pm + c) / 2 := by sorry
end LinearPriceRule.Concave
Source
Cohen, Perakis & Pindyck, SSRN 2673810, p. 4, §1.4, eq. (1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.