Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1, p. 42 — i = d is an equilibrium iff b ≤ (1 − γ(1 − δ))/(1 − δ)(π(a) − π(a^d_N)) and r ≥ (1 − δ)(γ(π(a) − π(a^d_N)) + b)
ProvedReviewBlackmail.SemiDec.step1_mechanismequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail
In the semi-decentralized game with genuine reviews kept, under the standing assumptions and , using the mechanism () is an equilibrium response to a ransom demand — when the market believes the seller uses the mechanism, its payoff is at least that of doing nothing, , and of settling, — if and only if
The second inequality says that the ransom must exceed the seller's expected loss from the mechanism; it is the ransom (7) of Proposition 5.
Formalization Note is added (division by ). The page simplifies the second displayed inequality to "", which drops the factor and the sign of ; the correct simplification, stated here, is the one Step 2 of the proof uses.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_SemiDec_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
theorem step1_mechanism (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (hδ : M.δ < 1) (r : ℝ) :
M.IsEq .d r ↔
M.b ≤ (1 - M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) / (1 - M.δ) *
(M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post (M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) 1 .N)) ∧
(1 - M.δ) * (M.γ * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post (M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) 1 .N)) + M.b) ≤ r := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 42, Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.