The core of the matching game is the set of stable matchings
ProvedAGT.stable_iff_coreA matching is stable exactly when it lies in the core of the matching game (Theorem 10.12 of Algorithmic Game Theory): admits no blocking pair if and only if no coalition can rematch within itself so that every member — the men of a nonempty set and their new partners — is strictly better off.
A note on the rendering. One direction embeds a blocking pair as the two-agent coalition , rematched by composing with the transposition of and ; the other reads off a blocking pair from any member of a defecting coalition. No finiteness is needed and none is assumed: the statement holds for arbitrary sets of men and women.
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
namespace AGT
/-- The core of the matching game is exactly the set of stable matchings
(Theorem 10.12 of *Algorithmic Game Theory*): a matching admits no
blocking pair if and only if no coalition can rematch among itself with
every member strictly better off. One direction embeds a blocking pair as
a two-agent coalition via a transposition; the other reads off a blocking
pair from any defecting coalition. No finiteness is needed. -/
theorem stable_iff_core {M W : Type*} (PM : M → W → W → Prop)
(PW : W → M → M → Prop) (hM : IsPrefProfile PM) (hW : IsPrefProfile PW)
(μ : M ≃ W) :
IsStableMatching PM PW μ ↔ ¬ MatchDominated PM PW μ := by
sorry
end AGTRead-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5
Read-back: stable_iff_core
Setting and hypotheses. Let and be two arbitrary types — unlike the existence theorems in this bundle, no finiteness is assumed here, and neither is any cardinality hypothesis: instead a particular bijection is handed in directly. The data are:
- assigning to each a binary relation on , and assigning to each a binary relation on (write , resp. , when the relation holds of that ordered pair);
- : every is a strict total order on (trichotomous, irreflexive, transitive), and : every is a strict total order on ;
- a given bijection (an
Equiv, with inverse ). Note that supplying itself presupposes and are equipotent for the instance to be non-degenerate.
Conclusion (an if-and-only-if). The following two statements are equivalent.
Left side — is a stable matching (unfolding IsStableMatching and IsBlockingPair):
i.e. there is no pair with 's relation holding of and 's relation holding of .
Right side — is not dominated (the negation of MatchDominated): it is not the case that there exist a bijection and a set of men such that
- is nonempty,
- for every : — each coalition man's relation holds of (his -partner, his -partner), and
- for every : — the relation of woman holds of (, the man she was matched to under ).
Features to note in the domination notion. The coalition contains men only; the women involved are implicitly . The deviating must be a globally defined bijection of all of onto all of , but its behavior outside is completely unconstrained — agents off the coalition may be reassigned arbitrarily and their preferences play no role. There is no closure requirement relating to : coalition men may claim women who were matched under to men outside . Both improvement conditions are required of all members of (there is no "weak improvement for all, strict for at least one" structure; every must have the displayed relations hold outright, which under irreflexivity of forces for all ).
Edge cases. If (hence ) is empty, the left side is vacuously true and the right side is true because no nonempty exists — the equivalence holds degenerately. The statement is a biconditional for the given , quantified over nothing further: it asserts both that stability precludes such a dominating pair and, conversely, that absence of any such pair implies no blocking pair exists.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).