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The core of the matching game is the set of stable matchings

Proved
AGT.stable_iff_core

by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymarket-designmechanism-designstable-matching

A matching is stable exactly when it lies in the core of the matching game (Theorem 10.12 of Algorithmic Game Theory): μ\muμ admits no blocking pair if and only if no coalition can rematch within itself so that every member — the men of a nonempty set SSS and their new partners — is strictly better off.

A note on the rendering. One direction embeds a blocking pair (m,w)(m, w)(m,w) as the two-agent coalition {m,w}\{m, w\}{m,w}, rematched by composing μ\muμ with the transposition of www and μ(m)\mu(m)μ(m); the other reads off a blocking pair from any member of a defecting coalition. No finiteness is needed and none is assumed: the statement holds for arbitrary sets of men and women.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
Formal statement
namespace AGT

/-- The core of the matching game is exactly the set of stable matchings
(Theorem 10.12 of *Algorithmic Game Theory*): a matching admits no
blocking pair if and only if no coalition can rematch among itself with
every member strictly better off.  One direction embeds a blocking pair as
a two-agent coalition via a transposition; the other reads off a blocking
pair from any defecting coalition.  No finiteness is needed. -/
theorem stable_iff_core {M W : Type*} (PM : M → W → W → Prop)
    (PW : W → M → M → Prop) (hM : IsPrefProfile PM) (hW : IsPrefProfile PW)
    (μ : M ≃ W) :
    IsStableMatching PM PW μ ↔ ¬ MatchDominated PM PW μ := by
  sorry

end AGT
Source
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481, Section 10.4.1, Theorem 10.12, pp. 257-258
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5

Read-back: stable_iff_core

Setting and hypotheses. Let MMM and WWW be two arbitrary types — unlike the existence theorems in this bundle, no finiteness is assumed here, and neither is any cardinality hypothesis: instead a particular bijection is handed in directly. The data are:

  • PMP^MPM assigning to each m∈Mm \in Mm∈M a binary relation PmMP^M_mPmM​ on WWW, and PWP^WPW assigning to each w∈Ww \in Ww∈W a binary relation PwWP^W_wPwW​ on MMM (write PmM(w,w′)P^M_m(w,w')PmM​(w,w′), resp. PwW(m,m′)P^W_w(m,m')PwW​(m,m′), when the relation holds of that ordered pair);
  • hMh_MhM​: every PmMP^M_mPmM​ is a strict total order on WWW (trichotomous, irreflexive, transitive), and hWh_WhW​: every PwWP^W_wPwW​ is a strict total order on MMM;
  • a given bijection μ:M→W\mu : M \to Wμ:M→W (an Equiv, with inverse μ−1\mu^{-1}μ−1). Note that supplying μ\muμ itself presupposes MMM and WWW are equipotent for the instance to be non-degenerate.

Conclusion (an if-and-only-if). The following two statements are equivalent.

Left side — μ\muμ is a stable matching (unfolding IsStableMatching and IsBlockingPair):

∀m∈M, ∀w∈W:¬(PmM(w, μ(m)) ∧ PwW(m, μ−1(w))),\forall m \in M,\ \forall w \in W:\quad \neg\Big( P^M_m\big(w,\ \mu(m)\big) \ \wedge\ P^W_w\big(m,\ \mu^{-1}(w)\big) \Big),∀m∈M, ∀w∈W:¬(PmM​(w, μ(m)) ∧ PwW​(m, μ−1(w))),

i.e. there is no pair (m,w)(m,w)(m,w) with mmm's relation holding of (w,μ(m))(w, \mu(m))(w,μ(m)) and www's relation holding of (m,μ−1(w))(m, \mu^{-1}(w))(m,μ−1(w)).

Right side — μ\muμ is not dominated (the negation of MatchDominated): it is not the case that there exist a bijection ν:M→W\nu : M \to Wν:M→W and a set S⊆MS \subseteq MS⊆M of men such that

  1. SSS is nonempty,
  2. for every m∈Sm \in Sm∈S: PmM(ν(m), μ(m))P^M_m\big(\nu(m),\ \mu(m)\big)PmM​(ν(m), μ(m)) — each coalition man's relation holds of (his ν\nuν-partner, his μ\muμ-partner), and
  3. for every m∈Sm \in Sm∈S: Pν(m)W(m, μ−1(ν(m)))P^W_{\nu(m)}\big(m,\ \mu^{-1}(\nu(m))\big)Pν(m)W​(m, μ−1(ν(m))) — the relation of woman ν(m)\nu(m)ν(m) holds of (mmm, the man she was matched to under μ\muμ).

Features to note in the domination notion. The coalition SSS contains men only; the women involved are implicitly ν(S)\nu(S)ν(S). The deviating ν\nuν must be a globally defined bijection of all of MMM onto all of WWW, but its behavior outside SSS is completely unconstrained — agents off the coalition may be reassigned arbitrarily and their preferences play no role. There is no closure requirement relating ν(S)\nu(S)ν(S) to μ(S)\mu(S)μ(S): coalition men may claim women who were matched under μ\muμ to men outside SSS. Both improvement conditions are required of all members of SSS (there is no "weak improvement for all, strict for at least one" structure; every m∈Sm \in Sm∈S must have the displayed relations hold outright, which under irreflexivity of PmMP^M_mPmM​ forces ν(m)≠μ(m)\nu(m) \neq \mu(m)ν(m)=μ(m) for all m∈Sm \in Sm∈S).

Edge cases. If MMM (hence WWW) is empty, the left side is vacuously true and the right side is true because no nonempty S⊆MS \subseteq MS⊆M exists — the equivalence holds degenerately. The statement is a biconditional for the given μ\muμ, quantified over nothing further: it asserts both that stability precludes such a dominating pair (ν,S)(\nu, S)(ν,S) and, conversely, that absence of any such pair implies no blocking pair exists.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Sep 13, 2026

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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