(5), App. B, PDF p. 34 — the ex post price p*(q̂) = (a − q̂)/b for q̂ < a/2 and a/(2b) for q̂ ≥ a/2
ProvedYieldPostpone.Interplay.eq_5p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1responsive-pricingsupply-chain
Let and let be the quantity available for sale. Under responsive pricing the retailer chooses to maximize its revenue . The maximizer is unique and equals
When stock is scarce the retailer clears it at the market-clearing price; when stock is ample it charges the monopoly price and leaves the excess unsold.
Formalization Note The page writes the second case as ; at both formulas give , which is included. The statement asserts that is the unique maximizer over the admissible prices .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldPostpone_Interplay_Setting
Formal statement
namespace YieldPostpone.Interplay
theorem eq_5 (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) (x : ℝ) :
(0 < x → x < P.a / 2 →
∀ p : ℝ, pAdm P p →
((∀ p' : ℝ, pAdm P p' → salesRev P p' x ≤ salesRev P p x) ↔ p = (P.a - x) / P.b)) ∧
(P.a / 2 ≤ x →
∀ p : ℝ, pAdm P p →
((∀ p' : ℝ, pAdm P p' → salesRev P p' x ≤ salesRev P p x) ↔ p = P.a / (2 * P.b))) := by sorry
end YieldPostpone.Interplay
Source
Geng, Guo, Xiao, Yang, Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement?, SSRN 3546872 (author version), App. B, PDF p. 34 (appendix p. 2), display (5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.