Lemma 1, p. 13 (PDF 15) — conditional praise versus monetary incentives
ProvedLeaderStyle.WageFloor.lemma_1incentive-contractsleadershipmoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-floor
For every reservation utility and wage floor , conditional praise is strictly cheaper for the principal than pure monetary incentives exactly when its benefit to the worker exceeds its cost to the leader:
Here strict preference means that one feasible F contract costs less than every feasible monetary contract. This comparison isolates the efficiency of praise from labor-market conditions.
Formalization Note Lemma 1 says “if”; the displayed cost formulas also give the converse, so this item states the equivalent comparison. The lemma's separate worker-rent clause is outside this item.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LeaderStyle_WageFloor_Model
Formal statement
namespace LeaderStyle.WageFloor
theorem lemma_1 (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
Prefers P .F .none ↔ condF P := by sorry
end LeaderStyle.WageFloor
Source
Dur, Kvaløy & Schöttner, Leadership Styles and Labor-Market Conditions, CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 278 (26 Feb 2021), p. 13 (PDF 15), Lemma 1, p. 13 (PDF 15)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.