Section 5 — every Nash-product maximizer strictly improves every conflict payoff
ProvedMyersonBargaining.NashSolution.maximizer_strictly_dominates_conflictLet be the conflict payoff vector and suppose some strictly dominates it in every player-type coordinate. If is a maximizer of the generalized Nash product over , then
Thus every bargaining solution lies strictly above the conflict point when that strict improvement is feasible. The maximum property here includes both membership in and comparison with every point of that set.
Formalization Note The paper's " is strictly dominated in " is the hypothesis that some has for all . A "maximum point" is a vector of at which (18) is at least its value at every point of ; neither the existence of a maximum nor its positivity is assumed. The generalized Nash product uses real powers with exponents .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
/-- Proof of Theorem 3, p. 69: every product maximizer improves all conflict payoffs. -/
theorem maximizer_strictly_dominates_conflict
(G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C)
(h : ∃ y ∈ FStar G, StrictlyDominates y (conflictPayoff G cstar))
(x : (Σ i, A i) → ℝ) (hx : IsBargainingSolution G cstar x) :
StrictlyDominates x (conflictPayoff G cstar) := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.