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Section 5 — every Nash-product maximizer strictly improves every conflict payoff

Proved
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.maximizer_strictly_dominates_conflict

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargainingoptimizationp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let ttt be the conflict payoff vector and suppose some y∈F∗y\in F^*y∈F∗ strictly dominates it in every player-type coordinate. If xxx is a maximizer of the generalized Nash product over F+∗F^*_+F+∗​, then

xi,ai>ti,aifor every player i and type ai.x_{i,a_i}>t_{i,a_i}\qquad\text{for every player }i\text{ and type }a_i.xi,ai​​>ti,ai​​for every player i and type ai​.

Thus every bargaining solution lies strictly above the conflict point when that strict improvement is feasible. The maximum property here includes both membership in F+∗F^*_+F+∗​ and comparison with every point of that set.

Formalization Note The paper's "ttt is strictly dominated in F∗F^*F∗" is the hypothesis that some y∈F∗y\in F^*y∈F∗ has yi,ai>ti,aiy_{i,a_i}>t_{i,a_i}yi,ai​​>ti,ai​​ for all i,aii,a_ii,ai​. A "maximum point" is a vector of F+∗F^*_+F+∗​ at which (18) is at least its value at every point of F+∗F^*_+F+∗​; neither the existence of a maximum nor its positivity is assumed. The generalized Nash product uses real powers with exponents Ri(ai)>0R_i(a_i)>0Ri​(ai​)>0.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

/-- Proof of Theorem 3, p. 69: every product maximizer improves all conflict payoffs. -/
theorem maximizer_strictly_dominates_conflict
    (G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C)
    (h : ∃ y ∈ FStar G, StrictlyDominates y (conflictPayoff G cstar))
    (x : (Σ i, A i) → ℝ) (hx : IsBargainingSolution G cstar x) :
    StrictlyDominates x (conflictPayoff G cstar) := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 69, proof of Theorem 3
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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