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Theorem 2 (Chatterjee–Samuelson): class AAA equilibrium strategies satisfy the linked differential equations (3a)–(3b)

Proved
ChatterjeeSamuelson.LinkedODE.linked_differential_equations

by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargainingbayesian-equilibriumgame-theoryincomplete-informationp2o-batch-p200ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider sealed-offer bargaining between a seller with reservation price vs∈[v‾s,vˉs]v_s \in [\underline v_s, \bar v_s]vs​∈[v​s​,vˉs​] and a buyer with reservation price vb∈[v‾b,vˉb]v_b \in [\underline v_b, \bar v_b]vb​∈[v​b​,vˉb​]: trade occurs iff the buyer's offer bbb is at least the seller's ask sss, at price kb+(1−k)skb + (1-k)skb+(1−k)s with 0≤k≤10 \le k \le 10≤k≤1. The buyer's belief about vsv_svs​ is a regular belief with distribution function FbF_bFb​ and density fbf_bfb​; the seller's belief about vbv_bvb​ is a regular belief with distribution function FsF_sFs​ and density fsf_sfs​. Let (S,B)(S, B)(S,B) be an equilibrium in which both strategies are of class AAA. Then:

  1. (3a) For every seller value yyy in an open interval (a,c)⊆[v‾s,vˉs](a, c) \subseteq [\underline v_s, \bar v_s](a,c)⊆[v​s​,vˉs​] on which SSS is strictly increasing, and every buyer value x∈[v‾b,vˉb]x \in [\underline v_b, \bar v_b]x∈[v​b​,vˉb​] with B(x)=S(y)B(x) = S(y)B(x)=S(y),
kFb(y)S′(y)+fb(y)S(y)=x fb(y).k F_b(y) S'(y) + f_b(y) S(y) = x\, f_b(y).kFb​(y)S′(y)+fb​(y)S(y)=xfb​(y).
  1. (3b) For every buyer value xxx in an open interval (a,c)⊆[v‾b,vˉb](a, c) \subseteq [\underline v_b, \bar v_b](a,c)⊆[v​b​,vˉb​] on which BBB is strictly increasing, and every seller value y∈[v‾s,vˉs]y \in [\underline v_s, \bar v_s]y∈[v​s​,vˉs​] with S(y)=B(x)S(y) = B(x)S(y)=B(x),
(1−k)(1−Fs(x))B′(x)−fs(x)B(x)=− y fs(x).(1-k)\bigl(1 - F_s(x)\bigr) B'(x) - f_s(x) B(x) = -\,y\, f_s(x).(1−k)(1−Fs​(x))B′(x)−fs​(x)B(x)=−yfs​(x).

Here xxx in (3a) is the paper's B−1(S(y))B^{-1}(S(y))B−1(S(y)) and yyy in (3b) is its S−1(B(x))S^{-1}(B(x))S−1(B(x)). The theorem turns the equilibrium problem into a pair of ordinary differential equations that link the two strategies; the paper's explicit equilibria (Example 1 for uniform beliefs) are solutions of this system.

Formalization Note S′(y)S'(y)S′(y) is Lean's deriv S y, which the class AAA assumption makes a genuine derivative at such yyy; no sign condition on S′(y)S'(y)S′(y) is assumed. The inverses B−1B^{-1}B−1, S−1S^{-1}S−1 are not introduced as functions: the matching value is a bound variable, so the equations are asserted exactly where the inverse is defined.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChatterjeeSamuelson_LinkedODE_RegularBelief
import Definitions.Def_ChatterjeeSamuelson_LinkedODE_ClassA
import Definitions.Def_ChatterjeeSamuelson_Shared_IsEquilibrium

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Set
Formal statement
namespace ChatterjeeSamuelson.LinkedODE

/-- **Theorem 2** (Chatterjee & Samuelson, *Bargaining under Incomplete Information*,
Oper. Res. 31(5) 1983, §2, p. 840 [PDF 6]): "In a class A equilibrium, over intervals of
reservation prices for which the offer strategies are strictly increasing, S( ) and B( )
must satisfy the linked differential equations
  kF_b(y)S′(y) + f_b(y)S(y) = B⁻¹(S(y))f_b(y)   (3a)
  (1 − k)(1 − F_s(x))B′(x) − f_s(x)B(x) = −S⁻¹(B(x))f_s(x).   (3b)"

Setting: `0 ≤ k ≤ 1`; seller values in `[loS, hiS]`, buyer values in `[loB, hiB]`; the
buyer's belief `μb` about `v_s` is regular on `[loS, hiS]` with CDF `F_b = cdf μb` and
density `fb`; the seller's belief `μs` about `v_b` is regular on `[loB, hiB]` with
`F_s = cdf μs` and density `fs`; `(S, B)` is an equilibrium and both strategies are of
class `A`. Then
* (3a) holds at every seller value `y` interior to an open interval `(a, c) ⊆ [loS, hiS]`
  on which `S` is strictly increasing, for every buyer value `x ∈ [loB, hiB]` with
  `B x = S y` (the paper's `B⁻¹(S(y))`);
* (3b) holds at every buyer value `x` interior to an open interval `(a, c) ⊆ [loB, hiB]`
  on which `B` is strictly increasing, for every seller value `y ∈ [loS, hiS]` with
  `S y = B x` (the paper's `S⁻¹(B(x))`).

*Formalization Note.* `S′(y)` is `deriv S y`; class `A` makes `S` differentiable there.
No sign condition on `S′(y)` is assumed. `B⁻¹` and `S⁻¹` are not introduced as functions:
the inverse image is a bound variable, so the equations are asserted exactly where the
paper's inverse is defined. -/
theorem linked_differential_equations (k : ℝ) (hk0 : 0 ≤ k) (hk1 : k ≤ 1)
    (μb μs : Measure ℝ) (loS hiS loB hiB : ℝ) (fb fs S B : ℝ → ℝ)
    (hμb : RegularBelief μb loS hiS fb) (hμs : RegularBelief μs loB hiB fs)
    (hEq : Shared.IsEquilibrium k μb μs loS hiS loB hiB S B)
    (hS : ClassA S loS hiS) (hB : ClassA B loB hiB) :
    (∀ a c y : ℝ, loS ≤ a → c ≤ hiS → y ∈ Ioo a c → StrictMonoOn S (Ioo a c) →
      ∀ x ∈ Icc loB hiB, B x = S y →
        k * cdf μb y * deriv S y + fb y * S y = x * fb y) ∧
    (∀ a c x : ℝ, loB ≤ a → c ≤ hiB → x ∈ Ioo a c → StrictMonoOn B (Ioo a c) →
      ∀ y ∈ Icc loS hiS, S y = B x →
        (1 - k) * (1 - cdf μs x) * deriv B x - fs x * B x = -(y * fs x)) := by sorry

end ChatterjeeSamuelson.LinkedODE
Source
Chatterjee & Samuelson, Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Oper. Res. 31(5) (1983), p. 840 [PDF 6], Theorem 2, equations (3a) and (3b)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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