Proposition 4, p. 23 — the marketplace prefers not to impose a price-parity clause iff q < 1/2 and μ > (v − c)/2; otherwise it prefers to impose one
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Parity.proposition_4Consider the marketplace-leakage game with uncertain switching costs: with probability buyers' switching costs are uniform on , i.e. for (baseline state), and with probability they are infinite (no-switching state). The seller knows the state; the marketplace does not when it sets its per-transaction fee. Let , and .
Let be the marketplace's optimal expected profit when it imposes a price-parity clause (the seller must set or be delisted), and its optimal expected profit without one. Both optima exist, and:
- the marketplace strictly prefers not to impose a PPC, , if and only if
- otherwise it prefers to impose a PPC: .
A price-parity clause eliminates leakage but forces the seller to choose between participating and delisting; the proposition says this cost dominates exactly when the baseline state is unlikely and switching costs in it are high.
Formalization Note. and are the IsPPCValue and IsNoPPCValue predicates of the setting file (attained maxima over the game's choices), and the theorem asserts that both exist and that the comparison holds for any values satisfying them. "Prefers to impose" is weak because there are ties: for and the two values coincide. The hypothesis is added: at both values equal and part 1 fails. (no uncertainty) is allowed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Parity_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
theorem proposition_4 (v c μ q : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hq0 : 0 < q) (hq1 : q ≤ 1) :
(∃ V, IsPPCValue v c μ q V) ∧ (∃ W, IsNoPPCValue v c μ q W) ∧
∀ V W, IsPPCValue v c μ q V → IsNoPPCValue v c μ q W →
((V < W ↔ (q < 1 / 2 ∧ (v - c) / 2 < μ)) ∧
(¬ (q < 1 / 2 ∧ (v - c) / 2 < μ) → W ≤ V)) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.