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Lemma OA9 — the coalition prefers auditing ScS_cSc​ to one independent supplier, and to no audit when K<K^K<\hat KK<K^

Proved
SupplierAudit.Joint.lemma_OA9

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auditingjoint-auditingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Consider the joint-auditing coalition with competing buyers (0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1), in the Sec. 4.3 scenario πb(0,0)≥πb(dM,0)≥πb(dM,dM)≥πb(2dM,dM)≥πb(2dM,2dM)\pi^b(0,0)\ge\pi^b(d_M,0)\ge\pi^b(d_M,d_M)\ge\pi^b(2d_M,d_M)\ge\pi^b(2d_M,2d_M)πb(0,0)≥πb(dM​,0)≥πb(dM​,dM​)≥πb(2dM​,dM​)≥πb(2dM​,2dM​). Let Πb(ec1,ecc,ec2)\Pi^b(e_{c1},e_{cc},e_{c2})Πb(ec1​,ecc​,ec2​) be its aggregate expected profit, and let

K^=max⁡y∈[0,1]Πb(0,y,0)∣K=0−Πb(0,0,0).\hat K=\max_{y\in[0,1]}\Pi^b(0,y,0)\big|_{K=0}-\Pi^b(0,0,0).K^=y∈[0,1]max​Πb(0,y,0)​K=0​−Πb(0,0,0).

Then:

  1. for every fixed cost K≥0K\ge0K≥0 and every effort y∈[0,1]y\in[0,1]y∈[0,1] there is an effort z∈[0,1]z\in[0,1]z∈[0,1] with Πb(y,0,0)≤Πb(0,z,0)\Pi^b(y,0,0)\le\Pi^b(0,z,0)Πb(y,0,0)≤Πb(0,z,0) and Πb(0,0,y)≤Πb(0,z,0)\Pi^b(0,0,y)\le\Pi^b(0,z,0)Πb(0,0,y)≤Πb(0,z,0), so auditing the common supplier is at least as good as auditing either independent supplier;
  2. K^≥0\hat K\ge0K^≥0;
  3. if 0≤K<K^0\le K<\hat K0≤K<K^, there is an effort y∈(0,1]y\in(0,1]y∈(0,1] with
Πb(0,y,0)>Πb(0,0,0),\Pi^b(0,y,0)>\Pi^b(0,0,0),Πb(0,y,0)>Πb(0,0,0),

so auditing the common supplier is strictly better than auditing no supplier.

This lemma is the first step of the case analysis behind Proposition 3: among single audits the coalition always prefers the common supplier.

Formalization Note The paper's "there exists a threshold K^\hat KK^" is stated with the threshold defined in its proof.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Joint_Model
Formal statement
namespace SupplierAudit.Joint

/-- Lemma OA9, p. ec11: under joint auditing, auditing the common supplier is at least as good as
auditing one independent supplier; and with `K̂` as defined in its proof, `K̂ ≥ 0` and for
`0 ≤ K < K̂` some joint audit of the common supplier is strictly better than auditing no supplier. -/
theorem lemma_OA9 (P : SupplierAudit.Competition.Params) (hβ : 0 < P.β) (hscen : Scenario P) :
    (∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → ∀ y ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∃ z ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
        aggProfit P K (y, 0, 0) ≤ aggProfit P K (0, z, 0) ∧
        aggProfit P K (0, 0, y) ≤ aggProfit P K (0, z, 0)) ∧
    0 ≤ Khat P ∧
    ∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → K < Khat P →
      ∃ y ∈ Set.Ioc (0 : ℝ) 1, aggProfit P K (0, 0, 0) < aggProfit P K (0, y, 0) := by sorry

end SupplierAudit.Joint
Source
Chen, Qi, Dawande, Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains, accepted manuscript (SSRN 2889889), Lemma OA9 and its proof, p. ec11 (PDF 39); scenario of Sec. 4.3, p. 13
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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