Proposition 1 — unique manufacturer-only subsidy under sales-based payment
ProvedRareDisease.Endogenous.proposition_1optimal-policyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sales-based-paymentsubsidy
Let be the R&D cost scale and the government's budget. Under manufacturer pricing and sales-based payment, define
The policy is optimal, and every optimal policy equals it. At every manufacturer best response to this policy, government spending equals , while patient welfare and manufacturer profit both equal
This identifies the unique subsidy allocation and confirms that the budget binds.
Formalization Note The paper implicitly requires and for the displayed formula. Optimality is an attained maximum over the full Stackelberg game, rather than an extremum of equation (13) taken as a definition.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RareDisease_Endogenous_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RareDisease.Endogenous
/-- Proposition 1, p. 12: unique sales-based optimum, binding budget, and equal
patient welfare and manufacturer profit. -/
theorem proposition_1 (k B : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hB : 0 < B) :
IsOptimalA k B (alphaStar k B) 0 ∧
(∀ α β : ℝ, IsOptimalA k B α β ↔ α = alphaStar k B ∧ β = 0) ∧
(∀ x ∈ BRA k (alphaStar k B) 0,
spendA k (alphaStar k B) 0 x.1 x.2 = B ∧
welfareA 0 x.1 x.2 = 2 * B / (Real.sqrt (256 * B * k + 1) - 1) ∧
profitA k (alphaStar k B) 0 x.1 x.2 =
2 * B / (Real.sqrt (256 * B * k + 1) - 1)) := by sorry
end RareDisease.Endogenous
Source
Olsder, Martagan, Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13), p. 12, §4.1, Proposition 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.