§3.2, p. 13 — willingness to pay for a data append: U_ij − U_i0 = −T_j + σ_l(α_j)[c_i − v_l(α_j)], increasing in c_i
ProvedSellingData.AppendsBinary.willingness_to_paydata-marketsinformation-sellingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1screening
Consider the data-append model with costs , a menu with plans , , and a plan with . Then for each type the willingness to pay for plan over the outside option is
Moreover, the map is strictly increasing, and in particular the high-cost type values plan strictly more than the low-cost type:
This is why, with data appends and costs below the prior mean, the high-cost marketers become the "high type" of the screening problem, reversing the roles they have with marketing lists.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SellingData_AppendsBinary_Setting
Formal statement
namespace SellingData.AppendsBinary
open Model
/-- §3.2, p. 13: when `c_L < c_H < û`, a marketer's willingness to pay for plan `(T_j, α_j)`,
`U_ij − U_i0`, equals `−T_j + σ_l(α_j)[c_i − v_l(α_j)]`, which is increasing in `c_i`. -/
theorem willingness_to_pay (M : Model) (hcH : M.cH < M.uHat) (m : Menu) (j : SellingData.ListsBinary.CostType)
(hαj : m.α j ∈ Set.Icc M.aLo M.aHi) :
(∀ i : SellingData.ListsBinary.CostType,
M.U m i j - M.outside (M.c i) = -(m.T j) + M.σl (m.α j) * (M.c i - M.vl (m.α j))) ∧
StrictMono (fun c : ℝ => -(m.T j) + M.σl (m.α j) * (c - M.vl (m.α j))) ∧
M.U m SellingData.ListsBinary.CostType.L j - M.outside M.cL < M.U m SellingData.ListsBinary.CostType.H j - M.outside M.cH := by sorry
end SellingData.AppendsBinary
Source
Guo, Selling Data to Marketers, author's manuscript (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350), p. 13, §3.2, second paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.