Sect. 6.2.2.1: in the single-unit second-price auction, bidding one's own valuation is a dominant strategy, whatever the other bids
ProvedRevenueManagement.second_price_dominantauctionsdominant-strategyoperations-researchsecond-price-auctionvickrey
In a single-unit second-price auction where the strictly highest bid wins and pays the highest other bid, a customer with valuation facing any bids of the others obtains a surplus from bidding that never exceeds the surplus from bidding : bidding one's valuation is a dominant strategy.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem second_price_dominant {m : ℕ} (v b : ℝ) (others : Fin m → ℝ) :
spSurplus v b others ≤ spSurplus v v others := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, pp. 249-250, Sect. 6.2.2.1 ('the strategy b*(vi) = vi is optimal for any realization of competing bids. Such a strategy is called a dominant strategy')
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.