General (possibly infinite) seller menus in the message-independent model
DefinitionLotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_GeneralMenuA general seller menu is a set of options — allocation probability and expected payment — that contains the outside option , may be infinite, and in which every type has a utility-maximizing option, so that
is attained (the proviso of p.15). Every published finite menu, with its outside option, is a general menu.
A utility-maximizing selection assigns to every type an option of attaining . In the message-independent model the intermediary sells the right to choose from : its best responses are the admissible (BIC, interim IR, feasible, integrable) direct mechanisms for values that attain the optimal fee revenue, exactly as in the published definitions for finite menus. When a best response forwards bidder with probability and the forwarded bidder takes , the seller earns
These objects let Theorem 6.6 bound the seller's revenue over arbitrary randomized truthful seller auctions.
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Intermediary
open MeasureTheory
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
/-- A general (possibly infinite) seller menu of (allocation probability, expected
payment) options. It contains the outside option `(0,0)` and every type has a
utility-maximizing option, so all maxima are well defined (p.15). -/
structure GenMenu where
options : Set (ℝ × ℝ)
valid : ∀ o ∈ options, o.1 ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 ∧ 0 ≤ o.2
outside : ((0 : ℝ), (0 : ℝ)) ∈ options
maximizer : ∀ t : ℝ, ∃ o ∈ options, ∀ o' ∈ options, o'.1 * t - o'.2 ≤ o.1 * t - o.2
/-- Every published finite menu, with its outside option, is a general menu. -/
noncomputable def GenMenu.ofMenu (M : Menu) : GenMenu where
options := ↑(allOptions M)
valid := by
classical
intro o ho
simp only [allOptions, Finset.coe_insert, Set.mem_insert_iff, Finset.mem_coe] at ho
rcases ho with rfl | ho
· exact ⟨⟨le_rfl, zero_le_one⟩, le_rfl⟩
· exact M.valid o ho
outside := by
classical
simp [allOptions]
maximizer := by
classical
intro t
obtain ⟨o, ho, hmax⟩ := (allOptions M).exists_max_image
(fun o : ℝ × ℝ => o.1 * t - o.2) (by simp [allOptions])
exact ⟨o, ho, fun o' ho' => hmax o' ho'⟩
/-- Utility of free access to the menu: the best option's utility (attained). -/
noncomputable def genAccessUtility (O : GenMenu) (t : ℝ) : ℝ :=
sSup ((fun o : ℝ × ℝ => o.1 * t - o.2) '' O.options)
/-- A selection `σ` choosing, for every type, a utility-maximizing option of `O`. -/
def IsUtilityMaximizing (O : GenMenu) (σ : ℝ → ℝ × ℝ) : Prop :=
∀ t : ℝ, σ t ∈ O.options ∧ ∀ o' ∈ O.options, o'.1 * t - o'.2 ≤ (σ t).1 * t - (σ t).2
/-- Message-independent model: a best response of the intermediary to a general
menu is an admissible access mechanism (values `u_O(v_i)`) of maximal fee revenue. -/
def GenBestResponse {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) (I : Mechanism n) : Prop :=
Admissible D (genAccessUtility O) I ∧
(revenue (prior D) I : EReal) = OptRev D (genAccessUtility O)
/-- Seller revenue under the access mechanism `I` when each forwarded bidder of
type `t` takes the option `σ t`. -/
noncomputable def genSellerRevenue {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (σ : ℝ → ℝ × ℝ)
(I : Mechanism n) : ℝ :=
∫ v, ∑ i, I.allocation v i * (σ (v i)).2 ∂prior D
end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement