(13), p. 14 — v₁f(1,q)Σ1/vᵢ ≤ Σf(i,q) ≤ vₙf(n,q)Σ1/vᵢ under strong network effects
ProvedNetworkQuality.PotentialMax.eq_13inequalitynetwork-effectsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
In the network market under the standing assumptions, fix a quality with strong network effects. Then
Dividing by , the threshold price of (12) satisfies : it lies in the price range in which both "all buy" and "none buy" are equilibria (Proposition 1(iii)).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NetworkQuality_PotentialMax_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NetworkQuality.PotentialMax
open Market
theorem eq_13 {n : ℕ} (M : Market n) (hM : M.Standing) (q : ℝ) (hq : 0 ≤ q)
(hs : M.StrongNE q) :
M.v ⟨0, hM.1⟩ * M.f 1 q * ∑ i : Fin n, 1 / M.v i ≤ ∑ i : Fin n, M.f (i.val + 1) q ∧
∑ i : Fin n, M.f (i.val + 1) q ≤
M.v ⟨n - 1, Nat.sub_lt hM.1 Nat.one_pos⟩ * M.f n q * ∑ i : Fin n, 1 / M.v i := by sorry
end NetworkQuality.PotentialMax
Source
Chan, Quality Strategies in Network Markets, SSRN 4203818 (version of April 2023), p. 14, (13)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.