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Lemma 5.1 — at a pure Nash equilibrium of a harmonic game every player is indifferent among all strategies

Proved
HarmonicGames.GenericPure.lemma_5_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theoryharmonic-gamesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let G=⟨M,{Em},{um}⟩G = \langle \mathcal M, \{E^m\}, \{u^m\}\rangleG=⟨M,{Em},{um}⟩ be a finite game with nonempty strategy sets, and suppose GGG is a harmonic game, i.e. its utility collection u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​ lies in H⊕N\mathcal H \oplus \mathcal NH⊕N. Let ppp be a pure Nash equilibrium of GGG: um(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m)u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) \ge u^m(q^m, p^{-m})um(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m) for every player mmm and every qm∈Emq^m \in E^mqm∈Em. Then

um(pm,p−m)=um(qm,p−m)for all m∈M and qm∈Em.u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) = u^m(q^m, p^{-m}) \qquad \text{for all } m \in \mathcal M \text{ and } q^m \in E^m .um(pm,p−m)=um(qm,p−m)for all m∈M and qm∈Em.

So at a pure equilibrium of a harmonic game, every player is indifferent between all of their strategies. This is the key step in showing that harmonic games generically have no pure Nash equilibrium.

Formalization Note Pure Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsPureNash from the published agt_games bundle, which is condition (1) of the paper. (qm,p−m)(q^m, p^{-m})(qm,p−m) is Function.update p m q.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.GenericPure

/-- **Lemma 5.1** (p. 23). Let `u` be a harmonic game (`u ∈ H ⊕ N`) and `p` a pure Nash
equilibrium of `u`. Then every player is indifferent between all of their strategies at `p`:
`u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) = u^m(q^m, p^{-m})` for all `m` and `q^m ∈ E^m`. -/
theorem lemma_5_1 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
    [∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
    (u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : IsHarmonicGame E u) (p : ∀ m, E m)
    (hp : AGT.IsPureNash (payoff E u) p) :
    ∀ (m : ι) (q : E m), payoff E u m p = payoff E u m (Function.update p m q) := by sorry

end HarmonicGames.GenericPure
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 23, Lemma 5.1, equation (32)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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