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Proposition 3(1),(3), p. 15 — the budget binds; patient-only subsidy if p ≥ 2/(5 − αmax), manufacturer-only if p ≤ 2(1 − αmax)/5

Proved
RareDisease.ExogOutcome.proposition_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

optimal-policyoutcome-based-paymentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1stackelberg-gamesubsidy

Consider Setting (2B): the consortium fixes the unit price p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1), the manufacturer is paid only when the drug is efficacious and best-responds to a subsidy policy (α,β)∈[0,1)2(\alpha,\beta)\in[0,1)^2(α,β)∈[0,1)2 by choosing its target efficacy e>0e>0e>0, and the government chooses the policy to maximize patient welfare subject to spending at most the budget B>0B>0B>0; the R&D cost scale is k>0k>0k>0. Let αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ be the largest α∈[0,1)\alpha\in[0,1)α∈[0,1) such that the policy (α,0)(\alpha,0)(α,0) is affordable at the manufacturer's best response. Then:

  1. (binding budget) at every optimal policy the spending at the manufacturer's best response equals BBB;
  2. (Proposition 3, part 1) if p≥25−αmax⁡p\ge \dfrac{2}{5-\alpha_{\max}}p≥5−αmax​2​ and B<p22kB<\dfrac{p^2}{2k}B<2kp2​, it is optimal to subsidize patients only: there is β1\beta_1β1​ such that (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​) is an optimal policy, and every optimal policy equals (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​);
  3. (Proposition 3, part 3) if p≤2(1−αmax⁡)5p\le \dfrac{2(1-\alpha_{\max})}{5}p≤52(1−αmax​)​, it is optimal to subsidize the manufacturer only: (αmax⁡,0)(\alpha_{\max},0)(αmax​,0) is an optimal policy, every optimal policy equals it, and
αmax⁡=8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p28Bk.\alpha_{\max}=\frac{8Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2-(p-p^2)\sqrt{16Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2}}{8Bk}.αmax​=8Bk8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p2​​.

The result says that under a consortium price with "No Cure No Pay" payment the government's whole budget goes to one side of the market when the price is high (patients) or low (the manufacturer).

Formalization Note Part 2 of the printed proposition (both subsidies when 2(1−αmax⁡)/5<p<2/(5−αmax⁡)2(1-\alpha_{\max})/5<p<2/(5-\alpha_{\max})2(1−αmax​)/5<p<2/(5−αmax​)) is not posed: it is false as printed (for B=0.05B=0.05B=0.05, k=0.3k=0.3k=0.3, p=0.2p=0.2p=0.2 the price lies in that range but the unique optimum is manufacturer-only). The printed closed form for β\betaβ in part 1 is not posed either, because it does not satisfy the binding constraint; β1\beta_1β1​ is characterized by the binding clause instead. Part 1 adds the hypothesis B<p2/(2k)B<p^2/(2k)B<p2/(2k): at α=0\alpha=0α=0 the spending tends to p2/(2k)p^2/(2k)p2/(2k) as β↑1\beta\uparrow1β↑1, so for larger budgets no patient-only policy exhausts the budget. The hypotheses k>0k>0k>0, B>0B>0B>0 and 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 are the paper's standing assumptions made explicit. "Optimal" quantifies over every policy and every best response; efficacies are not bounded by 111, as in the paper.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RareDisease_ExogOutcome_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RareDisease.ExogOutcome

/-- Proposition 3, p. 15, parts 1 and 3 (with the binding budget constraint), Setting (2B).
`a` is `α_max`. Part 1 adds the disclosed hypothesis `B < p² / (2k)`; part 2 and the printed
closed form of part 1 are not posed (both are false as printed). -/
theorem proposition_3 (k B p : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hB : 0 < B) (hp0 : 0 < p) (hp1 : p < 1)
    (a : ℝ) (ha : IsAlphaMax k p B a) :
    (∀ α β : ℝ, IsOptimal k p B α β → ∀ e ∈ BR k p α β, spend k p α β e = B) ∧
    (2 / (5 - a) ≤ p → B < p ^ 2 / (2 * k) →
      ∃ β₁ : ℝ, IsOptimal k p B 0 β₁ ∧
        ∀ α β : ℝ, IsOptimal k p B α β → α = 0 ∧ β = β₁) ∧
    (p ≤ 2 * (1 - a) / 5 →
      IsOptimal k p B a 0 ∧
        (∀ α β : ℝ, IsOptimal k p B α β → α = a ∧ β = 0) ∧
        a = (8 * B * k + p ^ 4 - 2 * p ^ 3 + p ^ 2
              - (p - p ^ 2) * Real.sqrt (16 * B * k + p ^ 4 - 2 * p ^ 3 + p ^ 2)) / (8 * B * k)) := by sorry

end RareDisease.ExogOutcome
Source
Olsder, Martagan, Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13), p. 15, Proposition 3, parts 1 and 3 (and its first sentence)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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