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Lemma 9 (second sentence) — every strategy-proof procedure is a tie-breaker followed by a strict strategy-proof procedure

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.lemma_9_ii

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofnesstie-breakingvoting

Consider a committee of n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 individuals and a finite set SmS_mSm​ of m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 alternatives, with indifference admissible on ballots. If the voting procedure v:πmn→Smv:\pi_m^n\to S_mv:πmn​→Sm​ is strategy-proof, then there exist a strict strategy-proof voting procedure ν:ρmn→Sm\nu:\rho_m^n\to S_mν:ρmn​→Sm​ and a tie-breaking function α:πmn→ρmn\alpha:\pi_m^n\to\rho_m^nα:πmn​→ρmn​ such that

v(B)=ν[α(B)]for all B∈πmn.v(B)=\nu[\alpha(B)]\qquad\text{for all } B\in\pi_m^n.v(B)=ν[α(B)]for all B∈πmn​.

The tie-breaking function α\alphaα need not be regular: α(B)i\alpha(B)_iα(B)i​ may depend on the whole ballot set BBB, not only on BiB_iBi​. This decomposition reduces the case of ballots with indifference to the strict case, and is the step that carries Theorem 1 over to Theorem 1′.

Formalization Note A tie-breaking function only has to keep every strict preference of every ballot; no regularity is required. The hypotheses n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 and m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 are the paper's standing assumptions on a committee (p. 6).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakGS_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS

/-- **Lemma 9, second sentence** (Satterthwaite, p. 41). In a committee (`n ≥ 1`, `m ≥ 3`), if the
voting procedure `v` is strategy-proof, then there exist a strict strategy-proof voting procedure
`ν` and a tie-breaking function `α` (not necessarily regular) with `v(B) = ν[α(B)]` for all
`B ∈ π^n_m`. -/
theorem lemma_9_ii {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
    (hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (v : VotingProcedure ι A) (hv : StrategyProof v) :
    ∃ (ν : StrictVotingProcedure ι A) (α : WeakProfile ι A → StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.StrongProfile ι A),
      StrictStrategyProof ν ∧ IsTieBreaking α ∧ ∀ B : WeakProfile ι A, v B = ν (α B) := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 9 (second sentence), p. 41
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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