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LEMMA 7.2 (as applied in the proof of LEMMA 8.3) — prices of an n−5n^{-5}n−5-equilibrium of D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) are positive and within a factor 2

Proved
PLCMarkets.ExactCover.lemma_7_2_prices_within_factor_two

by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

approximate-equilibriumarrow-debreumarket-equilibriump2o-batch-p100ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let n>35n>35n>35 be a multiple of 333 and let C=(C1,…,Cn)\mathcal C=(C_1,\dots,C_n)C=(C1​,…,Cn​) be a family of 333-element subsets of X={x1,…,xn}X=\{x_1,\dots,x_n\}X={x1​,…,xn​} whose union is XXX. If ppp is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate market equilibrium of the Arrow–Debreu market D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) with ϵ=n−5\epsilon=n^{-5}ϵ=n−5, then all prices are positive and within a factor 222 of each other:

p(j)>0andp(j)≤2 p(k)for all goods j,k.p(j)>0\quad\text{and}\quad p(j)\le 2\,p(k)\qquad\text{for all goods } j,k .p(j)>0andp(j)≤2p(k)for all goods j,k.

This is the price-regulation property enforced by agent 000, whose endowment dominates the market; the proof of Lemma 8.3 starts from it.

Formalization Note. Lemma 7.2 of the paper (p. 10:17) reads: "In any 0.9-approximate price equilibrium for this Fisher market instance F, the prices of all the goods are positive and are within a factor 2 of each other." It is stated for the Fisher instance of §7, which is built on a black-box market of Chen et al.; the proof of Lemma 8.3 (p. 10:21) applies it to the §8 markets with ϵ=n−5\epsilon=n^{-5}ϵ=n−5. This item states that application, for the market D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C), not the §7 lemma.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PLCMarkets_ExactCover_X3C
import Definitions.Def_PLCMarkets_ExactCover_MarketD
Formal statement
namespace PLCMarkets.ExactCover

theorem lemma_7_2_prices_within_factor_two (n : ℕ) (C : Fin n → Finset (Fin n))
    (hcard : ∀ i, (C i).card = 3) (hdiv : 3 ∣ n) (hn : 35 < n)
    (hcover : ∀ x : Fin n, ∃ i, x ∈ C i)
    (p : Good n → ℝ)
    (hp : (marketD C).IsApproxEquilibrium (((n : ℝ) ^ 5)⁻¹) p) :
    (∀ j, 0 < p j) ∧ ∀ j k, p j ≤ 2 * p k := by sorry

end PLCMarkets.ExactCover
Source
Vazirani and Yannakakis, Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities, J. ACM 58(3), Article 10, 2011, p. 10:17, LEMMA 7.2, as invoked on p. 10:21 in the proof of LEMMA 8.3
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Let n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N}n∈N and let C=(Ci)i<nC=(C_i)_{i<n}C=(Ci​)i<n​ be a family of subsets of {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}. Assume:

  • ∣Ci∣=3|C_i|=3∣Ci​∣=3 for every iii;
  • 3∣n3\mid n3∣n;
  • n>35n>35n>35;
  • every element lies in some CiC_iCi​.

Let ppp be any real price vector on the 2n+12n+12n+1 goods of D(C)D(C)D(C) that is a 1n5\tfrac1{n^5}n51​-approximate equilibrium of D(C)D(C)D(C) (the market is described below). That means:

  • p≥0p\ge 0p≥0 and ∑p=1\sum p=1∑p=1;
  • there is an allocation xxx giving every agent an optimal bundle, in the sense spelled out below;
  • for every good jjj,
∣∑ixij−sj∣≤1n5 sj,\Bigl|\sum_i x_{ij}-s_j\Bigr|\le \frac{1}{n^5}\,s_j,​i∑​xij​−sj​​≤n51​sj​,

where sjs_jsj​ is the total endowment of good jjj.

Conclusion. Every price is strictly positive, and for all goods j,kj,kj,k,

pj≤2 pk.p_j\le 2\,p_k.pj​≤2pk​.

The market D(C)D(C)D(C).

  • Goods: 000, CiC_iCi​, xjx_jxj​.
  • Agents: a regulator, CiC_iCi​, xjx_jxj​, and an extra agent EEE.
  • Endowments: the regulator owns n3n^3n3 of every good; CiC_iCi​ owns 111 of good CiC_iCi​; xjx_jxj​ owns 16\tfrac1661​ of good xjx_jxj​; EEE owns n2\tfrac n22n​ of good 000.
  • Utilities: for y≥0y\ge 0y≥0, "(c,a)(c,a)(c,a)" means the utility cmin⁡(y,a)c\min(y,a)cmin(y,a), with no utility beyond aaa.
    • Regulator, every good: 2min⁡(y,n3)+max⁡(y−n3,0)2\min(y,n^3)+\max(y-n^3,0)2min(y,n3)+max(y−n3,0).
    • CiC_iCi​: (1,12)(1,\tfrac12)(1,21​) on good 000, (13,16)(\tfrac13,\tfrac16)(31​,61​) on each xjx_jxj​ with j∈Cij\in C_ij∈Ci​, (19,14)(\tfrac19,\tfrac14)(91​,41​) on its own good CiC_iCi​, and 000 elsewhere.
    • xjx_jxj​: (1,112)(1,\tfrac1{12})(1,121​) on good 000 only.
    • EEE: (1,34)(1,\tfrac34)(1,43​) on each good CiC_iCi​ only.

Optimal bundle. A bundle is optimal for an agent if:

  • it is nonnegative;
  • it is affordable at income ∑jpjwij\sum_j p_jw_{ij}∑j​pj​wij​;
  • no nonnegative affordable bundle gives more utility;
  • it holds no more of a good with final slope 000 than that utility's total piece length, so 000 of every good valued flat.

Degenerate cases. Since n≥36n\ge 36n≥36, 1n5\tfrac1{n^5}n51​ is a well-defined positive number. The statement is conditional: if no approximate equilibrium exists for a given CCC, it holds vacuously for that CCC. It does not assert that one exists. Repeated sets Ci=CkC_i=C_kCi​=Ck​ with i≠ki\ne ki=k are allowed.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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