LEMMA 7.2 (as applied in the proof of LEMMA 8.3) — prices of an -equilibrium of are positive and within a factor 2
ProvedPLCMarkets.ExactCover.lemma_7_2_prices_within_factor_twoLet be a multiple of and let be a family of -element subsets of whose union is . If is an -approximate market equilibrium of the Arrow–Debreu market with , then all prices are positive and within a factor of each other:
This is the price-regulation property enforced by agent , whose endowment dominates the market; the proof of Lemma 8.3 starts from it.
Formalization Note. Lemma 7.2 of the paper (p. 10:17) reads: "In any 0.9-approximate price equilibrium for this Fisher market instance F, the prices of all the goods are positive and are within a factor 2 of each other." It is stated for the Fisher instance of §7, which is built on a black-box market of Chen et al.; the proof of Lemma 8.3 (p. 10:21) applies it to the §8 markets with . This item states that application, for the market , not the §7 lemma.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PLCMarkets_ExactCover_X3C import Definitions.Def_PLCMarkets_ExactCover_MarketD
namespace PLCMarkets.ExactCover
theorem lemma_7_2_prices_within_factor_two (n : ℕ) (C : Fin n → Finset (Fin n))
(hcard : ∀ i, (C i).card = 3) (hdiv : 3 ∣ n) (hn : 35 < n)
(hcover : ∀ x : Fin n, ∃ i, x ∈ C i)
(p : Good n → ℝ)
(hp : (marketD C).IsApproxEquilibrium (((n : ℝ) ^ 5)⁻¹) p) :
(∀ j, 0 < p j) ∧ ∀ j k, p j ≤ 2 * p k := by sorry
end PLCMarkets.ExactCover
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5
Let and let be a family of subsets of . Assume:
- for every ;
- ;
- ;
- every element lies in some .
Let be any real price vector on the goods of that is a -approximate equilibrium of (the market is described below). That means:
- and ;
- there is an allocation giving every agent an optimal bundle, in the sense spelled out below;
- for every good ,
where is the total endowment of good .
Conclusion. Every price is strictly positive, and for all goods ,
The market .
- Goods: , , .
- Agents: a regulator, , , and an extra agent .
- Endowments: the regulator owns of every good; owns of good ; owns of good ; owns of good .
- Utilities: for , "" means the utility , with no utility beyond .
- Regulator, every good: .
- : on good , on each with , on its own good , and elsewhere.
- : on good only.
- : on each good only.
Optimal bundle. A bundle is optimal for an agent if:
- it is nonnegative;
- it is affordable at income ;
- no nonnegative affordable bundle gives more utility;
- it holds no more of a good with final slope than that utility's total piece length, so of every good valued flat.
Degenerate cases. Since , is a well-defined positive number. The statement is conditional: if no approximate equilibrium exists for a given , it holds vacuously for that . It does not assert that one exists. Repeated sets with are allowed.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.