(20), p. 15 — welfare p(1 − (1 − β)p)³/(4(1 − α)k) and spending at the manufacturer's best response
ProvedRareDisease.ExogOutcome.reduced_problemoutcome-based-paymentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1subsidy
Consider Setting (2B) with , and a subsidy policy . At every best response of the manufacturer, the patient welfare and the government spending equal
These are the objective and the constraint of the government's reduced problem (20), obtained by substituting the follower's response into (10).
Formalization Note The statement is quantified over every element of the best-response set rather than over the closed form (19), so it ties (20) to the game. The page's constraint carries a stray closing parenthesis, which has no effect.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RareDisease_ExogOutcome_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RareDisease.ExogOutcome
/-- (20), p. 15: at the manufacturer's best response the patient welfare is
`p (1 - (1 - β) p)³ / (4 (1 - α) k)` and the government's spending is
`α p² (1 - (1 - β) p)² / (4 (1 - α)² k) + β p² (1 - (1 - β) p)² / (2 (1 - α) k)`. -/
theorem reduced_problem (k p α β : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hp0 : 0 < p) (hp1 : p < 1)
(hpol : RareDisease.Endogenous.IsPolicy α β) (e : ℝ) (he : e ∈ BR k p α β) :
welfare p β e = p * (1 - (1 - β) * p) ^ 3 / (4 * (1 - α) * k) ∧
spend k p α β e = α * p ^ 2 * (1 - (1 - β) * p) ^ 2 / (4 * (1 - α) ^ 2 * k)
+ β * p ^ 2 * (1 - (1 - β) * p) ^ 2 / (2 * (1 - α) * k) := by sorry
end RareDisease.ExogOutcome
Source
Olsder, Martagan, Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13), p. 15, (20)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.