Sect. 1 — Shapley cost shares exactly pay for the designed network
ProvedPriceOfStability.Harmonic.shapley_budget_balancecongestion-gamecost-sharingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-stability
Consider the fair (Shapley) cost-sharing game on players and a finite edge set , where the cost of an edge used by players is split equally among them. For every strategy vector , the players' payments add up to the cost of the designed network:
This budget-balance property identifies the social cost with the cost of the network, so bounds stated for either apply to the other.
Formalization Note. The paper states it for constant costs ; the statement here allows load-dependent costs (constant costs are the special case) and every strategy vector, feasible or not.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PriceOfStability_Harmonic_Model open CongestionPoA.AsymSum
Formal statement
namespace PriceOfStability.Harmonic
/-- Anshelevich et al., *The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation*, SIAM J.
Comput. 38 (2008), Sect. 1, p. 1603 (PDF p. 2), unnumbered display: the Shapley cost shares completely pay
for the designed network, `Σᵢ Cᵢ(S₁, …, S_k) = Σ_{e ∈ ∪ᵢ Sᵢ} c_e`.
**Formalization Note.** Stated for load-dependent edge costs `c_e(x)` (constant costs are
`c e x = c_e`) and for every strategy vector, feasible or not: the identity uses neither. -/
theorem shapley_budget_balance {ι E : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Fintype E]
[DecidableEq E] (strategies : ι → Finset (Finset E)) (c : E → ℕ → ℝ) (S : ι → Finset E) :
sumCost (fairGame strategies c) S = designCost c S := by sorry
end PriceOfStability.Harmonic
Source
Anshelevich et al., The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), DOI 10.1137/070680096, p. 1603 (PDF p. 2), Sect. 1, unnumbered display
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.