Theorem 2, p. 1002 — under ξ ∼ U(0,1), for κ ∈ (0, Π) and small ε the target rebate and returns contract (w*, u(T*), b(T*), T*) exists, coordinates effort and quantity, and gives R* = κ, M* = Π − κ
ProvedChannelRebate.Effort.theorem2_rebate_returns_coordinationLet , , , let and . Let solve , , , and let be the integrated channel's optimal profit. Fix .
For a wholesale price and a target , the contract uses the rebate and return credit of p. 1001; and are the fixed points of Lemma 6, the retailer's profit at effort and her profit at effort . Say that is set as in Theorem 2 for when
Then there is such that for every with :
- (a) such exist; and for every such pair, with and , we have , , and ;
- (b) the contract achieves channel coordination: is the unique maximizer of the retailer's profit over , ;
- (c) the resulting profits are for the retailer and for the manufacturer.
So a target rebate combined with returns, unlike either instrument alone, aligns both the retailer's effort and her order with the integrated channel's and can split the channel profit in any proportion.
Formalization Note. depends on only. Part (a) is stated as existence plus, for every pair set this way, the listed inequalities; (b) and (c) are claimed for every such pair. is the standing Assumption A1 and is part of "set as in Theorem 2". , , , are given by their defining equations; depends on through and , though the paper writes . The manufacturer's profit is not displayed in the paper; it is defined from the cash flows (wholesale revenue, rebate paid, units bought back at and salvaged at ), so that .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Effort_Setting open MeasureTheory Filter Topology
namespace ChannelRebate.Effort
theorem theorem2_rebate_returns_coordination
(p c s a : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p) (hsc : s < c) (ha : 0 < a)
(Qb : ℝ) (hQb : IsQbar0 p c s Qb)
(κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκPi : κ < Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb)) :
∃ ε₀ : ℝ, 0 < ε₀ ∧ ∀ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε → ε < ε₀ → ε < κ →
(∃ w T : ℝ, c < w ∧ w < p ∧
(∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) ∧
IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) ∧ IsLbar p c s a w T κ) ∧
∀ w T : ℝ, c < w → w < p →
(∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) →
IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) → IsLbar p c s a w T κ →
(0 < uT p c s a w T ∧ s < bT p c s a w T ∧ bT p c s a w T < w ∧ 0 < T) ∧
optimalPairs (R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T) =
{(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb, ebarOf p s a Qb)} ∧
R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T
(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = κ ∧
M c s w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) T
(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb) - κ := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Effort
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.