§3.1, p. 12 — the firm's optimal price is p∗ = [(c + γ)e + ū]/2
ProvedCurbEmissions.ExactStandard.optimal_priceemission-standardsmonopoly-pricingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let the standing assumptions of the model hold, and consider a product of efficiency level sold in a market of size whose consumers' valuations are uniform on . The firm's operating profit at price is , with the buying share clipped to . Then the price
maximizes this profit over all . Moreover, whenever the margin is positive, is the unique maximizer.
This justifies evaluating the firm's profits, the sales volumes and the consumer utilities of the base model at .
Formalization Note When nobody buys at any price that covers cost, every price with zero share is optimal, and only the optimality of is asserted.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CurbEmissions_ExactStandard_Model
Formal statement
namespace CurbEmissions.ExactStandard
/-- §3.1, p. 12: for every efficiency level `e ≥ 0` and market size `m > 0`, the price
`p∗ = [(c + γ)e + ū]/2` maximizes the firm's operating profit, and it is the unique maximizer while the
margin `ū − (c − γ)e` is positive. -/
theorem optimal_price (P : Params) (hP : Standing P) (e m : ℝ) (he : 0 ≤ e) (hm : 0 < m) :
(∀ p, priceObj P e m p ≤ priceObj P e m (pStar P e)) ∧
((P.c - P.gam) * e < P.ubar →
∀ p, p ≠ pStar P e → priceObj P e m p < priceObj P e m (pStar P e)) := by sorry
end CurbEmissions.ExactStandard
Source
Han, Hu & Dawande, Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets, MSOM (authors' accepted manuscript, 2022-07-28), p. 12, §3.1 (unnumbered claim following eq. (1))
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.