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Theorem 3' (Arrow) — with indifference allowed, a social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR and IIA is dictatorial

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow.theorem_3_prime

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

arrow-theoremdictatorshipp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choiceweak-orders

Let a committee have n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 members and m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 alternatives, and let ballots and social orderings be weak orders, so indifference is allowed. Let uuu be a social welfare function, assigning a weak social ordering A=u(B)A=u(B)A=u(B) to every ballot set B∈πmnB\in\pi_m^nB∈πmn​. If uuu satisfies citizens' sovereignty, non-negative response and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then uuu is dictatorial: some individual iii exists such that

x Bˉi y  ⟹  x Aˉ yfor all B∈πmn and all x,y∈Sm.x\,\bar B_i\,y \;\Longrightarrow\; x\,\bar A\,y\qquad\text{for all } B\in\pi_m^n \text{ and all } x,y\in S_m .xBˉi​y⟹xAˉyfor all B∈πmn​ and all x,y∈Sm​.

This is Arrow's general possibility theorem in its original setting of weak orders. The converse fails: a dictator's indifferences may be resolved by a rule that violates IIA.

Formalization Note "Dictatorial" is the negation of the paper's ND (p. 29) and says nothing about pairs the dictator is indifferent between. CS is stated for distinct alternatives; the printed "for every x,yx,yx,y" cannot hold at x=yx=yx=y and would make the theorem vacuous. Weak orders are a structure (complete and transitive relation), and uuu is defined on all of πmn\pi_m^nπmn​. n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 and m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 are the printed hypotheses.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakArrow_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow

/-- **Theorem 3' (Arrow)**, Satterthwaite p. 49: for a committee with `n ≥ 2` and `m ≥ 3`, whose
ballots are weak orders, a social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR and IIA is dictatorial: some
individual `i` exists such that, at every ballot set `B`, `x B̄_i y` implies `x Ā y`. -/
theorem theorem_3_prime {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (u : WeakProfile ι A → WeakOrder A)
    (hCS : CS u) (hNNR : NNR u) (hIIA : IIA u) :
    Dictatorial u := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Theorem 3', p. 49
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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