Theorem 3' (Arrow) — with indifference allowed, a social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR and IIA is dictatorial
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow.theorem_3_primeLet a committee have members and alternatives, and let ballots and social orderings be weak orders, so indifference is allowed. Let be a social welfare function, assigning a weak social ordering to every ballot set . If satisfies citizens' sovereignty, non-negative response and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then is dictatorial: some individual exists such that
This is Arrow's general possibility theorem in its original setting of weak orders. The converse fails: a dictator's indifferences may be resolved by a rule that violates IIA.
Formalization Note "Dictatorial" is the negation of the paper's ND (p. 29) and says nothing about pairs the dictator is indifferent between. CS is stated for distinct alternatives; the printed "for every " cannot hold at and would make the theorem vacuous. Weak orders are a structure (complete and transitive relation), and is defined on all of . and are the printed hypotheses.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakArrow_Basic
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow
/-- **Theorem 3' (Arrow)**, Satterthwaite p. 49: for a committee with `n ≥ 2` and `m ≥ 3`, whose
ballots are weak orders, a social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR and IIA is dictatorial: some
individual `i` exists such that, at every ballot set `B`, `x B̄_i y` implies `x Ā y`. -/
theorem theorem_3_prime {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(u : WeakProfile ι A → WeakOrder A)
(hCS : CS u) (hNNR : NNR u) (hIIA : IIA u) :
Dictatorial u := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.