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Proposition 2, p. 12 — every innovation equilibrium is a duopoly; T*(β) is an equilibrium, boundary if k2 < k̂2(k1|β), interior otherwise

Proved
CrossLicensing.Innovation.proposition_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cross-licensinginnovationnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Assume 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1 and 49/144<k2<k149/144 < k_2 < k_149/144<k2​<k1​. In the innovation game, manufacturer MiM_iMi​ chooses Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 and earns Πi∗(T1,T2∣β)−kiTi2\Pi^*_i(T_1, T_2\mid\beta) - k_iT_i^2Πi∗​(T1​,T2​∣β)−ki​Ti2​, where Πi∗\Pi^*_iΠi∗​ is its Cournot profit at the supplier's optimal wholesale price (the least maximizer of r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​) over r≥0r \ge 0r≥0). Let T∗(β)=(T1B,T2B)T^*(\beta) = (T^B_1, T^B_2)T∗(β)=(T1B​,T2B​) if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β) and T∗(β)=(T1I,T2I)T^*(\beta) = (T^I_1, T^I_2)T∗(β)=(T1I​,T2I​) otherwise, with the closed forms of the proof. Then:

  1. every pure Nash equilibrium of the innovation game is a downstream duopoly (both manufacturers sell a positive quantity);
  2. T1∗(β),T2∗(β)≥0T^*_1(\beta), T^*_2(\beta) \ge 0T1∗​(β),T2∗​(β)≥0, the profile T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is a pure Nash equilibrium, and it is a duopoly;
  3. (boundary duopoly) if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), then β<3−1\beta < \sqrt3 - 1β<3​−1, T∗(β)=(T1B,T2B)T^*(\beta) = (T^B_1, T^B_2)T∗(β)=(T1B​,T2B​) and the superior manufacturer invests exactly up to the duopoly boundary:
T2∗=T^2(T1∗∣β);T^*_2 = \hat T_2(T^*_1\mid\beta);T2∗​=T^2​(T1∗​∣β);
  1. (interior duopoly) if k2≥k^2(k1∣β)k_2 \ge \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​≥k^2​(k1​∣β), then T∗(β)=(T1I,T2I)T^*(\beta) = (T^I_1, T^I_2)T∗(β)=(T1I​,T2I​) and both first-order conditions hold there:
∂∂T1[Π1d(T1,T2∗)−k1T12]∣T1∗=0,∂∂T2[Π2d(T1∗,T2)−k2T22]∣T2∗=0,\frac{\partial}{\partial T_1}\big[\Pi^d_1(T_1, T^*_2) - k_1T_1^2\big]\Big|_{T^*_1} = 0,\qquad \frac{\partial}{\partial T_2}\big[\Pi^d_2(T^*_1, T_2) - k_2T_2^2\big]\Big|_{T^*_2} = 0,∂T1​∂​[Π1d​(T1​,T2∗​)−k1​T12​]​T1∗​​=0,∂T2​∂​[Π2d​(T1∗​,T2​)−k2​T22​]​T2∗​​=0,

with Πid\Pi^d_iΠid​ Lemma 1's duopoly gross profits.

Proposition 2 says that a supplier committing to cross-licensing never ends up with a single seller: the superior manufacturer either stops at the boundary where the supplier still prefers a duopoly, or innovates at an unconstrained interior level. Proposition 3 is its instance β=0\beta = 0β=0.

Formalization Note The equilibrium is not unique in general (for some parameters a mirrored boundary profile with M1M_1M1​ on its own boundary is also an equilibrium), so the statement asserts that T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is an equilibrium and that every equilibrium is a duopoly, not that T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is the only one. The first-order conditions are taken on Lemma 1's duopoly polynomials, because the game payoff of M2M_2M2​ jumps at T2=T^2T_2 = \hat T_2T2​=T^2​. The paper's "or equivalently β<β^(k1,k2)\beta < \hat\beta(k_1, k_2)β<β^​(k1​,k2​)" is not formalized; "this region shrinks to empty as β\betaβ increases" is the milestone on k^2\hat k_2k^2​'s monotonicity.


Retired 2026-10-27: a Lean-vs-paper fidelity audit found this statement weaker than, or narrower than, the cited result. A corrected statement will be resubmitted.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CrossLicensing_Innovation_Model
import Definitions.Def_CrossLicensing_Innovation_ClosedForms
Formal statement
namespace CrossLicensing.Innovation

theorem proposition_2 (β k1 k2 : ℝ) (h : Standing β k1 k2) :
    (∀ T1 T2 : NNReal, IsInnovationEquilibrium β k1 k2 T1 T2 → IsDuopoly β T1 T2) ∧
    (∃ T1 T2 : NNReal, (T1 : ℝ) = Tstar1 β k1 k2 ∧ (T2 : ℝ) = Tstar2 β k1 k2 ∧
      IsInnovationEquilibrium β k1 k2 T1 T2) ∧
    IsDuopoly β (Tstar1 β k1 k2) (Tstar2 β k1 k2) ∧
    (k2 < khat2 β k1 →
      β < Real.sqrt 3 - 1 ∧ Tstar1 β k1 k2 = TB1 β k1 ∧ Tstar2 β k1 k2 = TB2 β k1 ∧
      Tstar2 β k1 k2 = That2 β (Tstar1 β k1 k2)) ∧
    (khat2 β k1 ≤ k2 →
      Tstar1 β k1 k2 = TI1 β k1 k2 ∧ Tstar2 β k1 k2 = TI2 β k1 k2 ∧
      HasDerivAt (fun x => duoGross1 β x (Tstar2 β k1 k2) - k1 * x ^ 2) 0 (Tstar1 β k1 k2) ∧
      HasDerivAt (fun x => duoGross2 β (Tstar1 β k1 k2) x - k2 * x ^ 2) 0 (Tstar2 β k1 k2)) := by sorry

end CrossLicensing.Innovation
Source
Wang, Huang, Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN 3053682 (version of 2023-04-27), p. 12, Proposition 2; proof pp. A.1–A.2 (PDF 33–34)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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