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Appendix E.1.3, p. 47, with (36), p. 43 — if γ(1 − λ) ≤ 27/8, a net fee satisfying (20) is a best response in the Logit duopoly

Proved
NetFeePlatform.InteropDominance.foc_best_response

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

best-responseinteroperabilitylogit-demandp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-competition

Consider the Logit duopoly without outside option, with marginal cost ccc, network-interaction value γ\gammaγ and interoperability λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1], and assume

γ(1−λ)≤278.\gamma(1-\lambda)\le\frac{27}{8}.γ(1−λ)≤827​.

Let t=(t1,t2)t=(t^1,t^2)t=(t1,t2) be a fee profile and jjj a platform whose net fee satisfies the first-order condition (20), tj=c+11−nj−2γnj−γλ(1−nj)+γλnjt^j=c+\frac{1}{1-n^j}-2\gamma n^j-\gamma\lambda(1-n^j)+\gamma\lambda n^jtj=c+1−nj1​−2γnj−γλ(1−nj)+γλnj. Then tjt^jtj is a best response to the other platform's fee: for every s∈Rs\in\mathbb Rs∈R,

πj(t−j,s)≤πj(t).\pi^j(t^{-j},s)\le\pi^j(t).πj(t−j,s)≤πj(t).

In the appendix the second derivative of profit in the own share is −1/(nj(1−nj)2)+2γ(1−λφj)-1/(n^j(1-n^j)^2)+2\gamma(1-\lambda\varphi^j)−1/(nj(1−nj)2)+2γ(1−λφj), with diversion ratio φj=1\varphi^j=1φj=1 here; since 1/(n(1−n)2)≥27/41/(n(1-n)^2)\ge 27/41/(n(1−n)2)≥27/4 on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) (display (36)), the condition γ(1−λ)≤27/8\gamma(1-\lambda)\le 27/8γ(1−λ)≤27/8 makes profit concave in the own share, so the first-order condition is sufficient.

Formalization Note The bound 27/827/827/8 is the paper's 3.3753.3753.375, half the minimum 6.75=27/46.75=27/46.75=27/4 of 1/(n(1−n)2)1/(n(1-n)^2)1/(n(1−n)2) attained at n=1/3n=1/3n=1/3 ((36), p. 43).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NetFeePlatform_Competition_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NetFeePlatform.InteropDominance

theorem foc_best_response (c γ lam : ℝ) (hlam0 : 0 ≤ lam) (hlam1 : lam ≤ 1)
    (hreg : γ * (1 - lam) ≤ 27 / 8) (t : Fin 2 → ℝ) (j : Fin 2)
    (hfoc : t j = c + 1 / (1 - NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) - 2 * γ * NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j
      - γ * lam * (1 - NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) + γ * lam * NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) :
    ∀ s : ℝ, NetFeePlatform.Competition.profit 0 c γ lam (Function.update t j s) j ≤ NetFeePlatform.Competition.profit 0 c γ lam t j := by sorry

end NetFeePlatform.InteropDominance
Source
Ekmekci, White & Wu, Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model, accepted working-paper version (December 12, 2024), pp. 46–47, Appendix E.1.3; p. 43, (36)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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