Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Theorem 2.6, p. 7 — Nash equilibria equal the C-minimizers

Proved
NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint.theorem_2_6

by mikedeng1 · Oct 21, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

nash-equilibriumordering-conep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pareto-optimalityshared-constraint-gamevector-optimization

For an NNN-player shared-constraint game with N≥2N\ge2N≥2, let fif_ifi​ be arbitrary real-valued cost functions, X\mathbb XX any shared feasible set of joint strategies, g(x)=(x,f(x))g(x)=(x,f(x))g(x)=(x,f(x)), and CCC the ordering cone of equation (6). The whole Nash equilibrium set is exactly the vector minimizer set:

NE(f,X)=C-argmin{(x,f(x)):x∈X}.\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X) =C\text{-argmin}\{(x,f(x)):x\in\mathbb X\}.NE(f,X)=C-argmin{(x,f(x)):x∈X}.

The equality applies without regularity, convexity, or existence assumptions and can therefore describe an empty equilibrium set or one with many points.

Formalization Note A joint strategy is a dependent function over a finite player type; its iiith unilateral deviation is Function.update. The shared feasible set is never replaced by a product set. The N≥2N\ge2N≥2 hypothesis reproduces the paper's standing model assumption, although the equality itself does not need it.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NashVecOpt_SharedConstraint_Model
Formal statement
namespace NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
  {E : ι → Type} [∀ i, AddCommGroup (E i)] [∀ i, Module ℝ (E i)]

/-- Theorem 2.6, p. 7: the Nash equilibria of a shared-constraint game are exactly the
Pareto minimizers of its augmented objective under cone (6). -/
theorem theorem_2_6 (hN : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (f : ι → (∀ j, E j) → ℝ)
    (X : Set (∀ j, E j)) :
    NE f X = vArgMin (orderCone (E := E)) (obj f) X := by sorry

end NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint
Source
Feinstein, Rudloff, Characterizing and Computing the Set of Nash Equilibria via Vector Optimization, arXiv:2109.14932v5, p. 7, Theorem 2.6
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 21, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 21, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me