The countering correspondence has nonempty values in the mixed-profile space
ProvedNash1950.Countering.counteringSet_nonempty_subsetbest-responsegame-theorymixed-strategiesp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Suppose every player has a finite, nonempty pure-strategy set. For each mixed profile , the set of profiles countering is nonempty and consists entirely of mixed profiles:
This makes a correspondence from the product of mixed-strategy spaces into itself, as required for Nash's fixed-point argument.
Formalization Note. Nonemptiness of each pure-strategy set is implicit in the source's use of probability distributions and is explicit here. The player type itself may be empty.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem counteringSet_nonempty_subset {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, AGT.IsMixedProfile P →
(counteringSet u P).Nonempty ∧
counteringSet u P ⊆ {Q | AGT.IsMixedProfile Q} := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶3, sentence 1 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.