§4.1, p. 11 —
ProvedReviewBlackmail.Central.posterior_orderbayesian-updatingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1posterior-beliefreview-blackmail
Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, let with . Then the posteriors after a negative review are strictly ordered:
A negative review is most damaging when the market believes the seller settles every blackmail attempt (then it can only come from a regular consumer) and least damaging when it believes the seller ignores them; the centralized mechanism sits in between. This ordering drives the equilibrium analysis of Propositions 1–2 and the jump of Corollary 1.
Formalization Note The page states the ordering as a consequence of Lemma 2 for the general ; the hypothesis is added because at one has and at one has , so strictness fails there.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central
theorem posterior_order (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (γ δ : ℝ) (hγ : γ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hδ : δ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hpos : 0 < γ * δ) (hlt : γ * δ < 1) :
M.post (keep (γ * δ) .s) .N < M.post (keep (γ * δ) .c) .N ∧
M.post (keep (γ * δ) .c) .N < M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), §4.1, p. 11, after Lemma 2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.