Proposition 8, p. 29 — the monopoly's optimal AV capacity is N* = n*_{HV,K}, K the smallest i with Σ_{K+1}^I P(m_i) < c_f/(w₀ − c_v)
ProvedAVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity.proposition8_optimal_capacityConsider a ride-hailing market in which a monopoly supplier of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and human drivers (HVs) operate on a common platform. The market has pickup-time function with and , trip time , maximal rider value , and perfectly elastic HV supply at reservation earnings (). AVs cost per operating hour and per calendar hour, with (Assumption 1).
Demand is random with scenarios: potential demand masses with probabilities , . Each scenario is a loose market (condition (33)); is its maximal stable pure-HV equilibrium demand and the pure-HV equilibrium fleet size. The supplier first fixes a capacity and then, in each scenario, a fleet , maximizing (5):
where is the common-platform variable profit per AV (251).
Let be the smallest index such that . Then
is an optimal capacity for (5).
The result says the monopoly's capacity problem is a newsvendor problem: the optimal capacity is the pure-HV fleet size of the scenario at the critical fractile of the demand distribution.
Formalization Note. Scenarios are indexed by Fin I, from to ; the page's is the sum over indices strictly above , and "the smallest " is IsLeast. The page's "in a loose market" is the loose-market condition (33) in every scenario. The conclusion is that maximizes (5) over , not that it is the unique maximizer: when exactly, the objective takes the same value at , so the page's "the optimal AV capacity" is one of the optima. The variable profit is the paper's summary (251) of Proposition 6, taken as a definition.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AVRideHail_MonopolyCapacity_Model
namespace AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity
theorem proposition8_optimal_capacity (P : AVRideHail.PureHV.MarketParams) (ha : 0 < P.a) (hr0 : 0 < P.r)
(hr1 : P.r < 1) (ht2 : 0 < P.t2) (hV : 0 < P.V) (halpha : P.alpha = 0)
(cv cf : ℝ) (hcv : 0 < cv) (hcf : 0 < cf) (hA1 : cv + cf < P.w0)
(I : ℕ) (hI : 0 < I) (prob : Fin I → ℝ) (hprob : ∀ i, 0 ≤ prob i) (hsum : ∑ i, prob i = 1)
(m : Fin I → ℝ) (hm : StrictMono m) (hmpos : ∀ i, 0 < m i)
(hloose : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.LooseMarket P (m i))
(dstar : Fin I → ℝ) (hdstar : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.IsMaxStableEq P (m i) (dstar i))
(K : Fin I) (hK : IsLeast {k : Fin I | ∑ j ∈ Finset.Ioi k, prob j < cf / (P.w0 - cv)} K) :
IsMaxOn (monoProfit P cv cf prob m dstar) (Set.Ici 0) (AVRideHail.PureHV.nMin P (dstar K)) := by sorry
end AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.