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Appendix A, proof of Proposition 1, p. 38 — rounding loses at most ε/δ of each payment: t(v′) ≥ t(v) − ε/δ

Proved
ApproxIC.Rounding.payment_loss_bound

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

approximate-incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1rounding

Let m=(x,t)∈M(ε)m=(x,t)\in\mathcal M(\varepsilon)m=(x,t)∈M(ε) be an ε\varepsilonε-incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism on S=[0,vˉ]S=[0,\bar v]S=[0,vˉ], let δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1), and let vδ⋆:S→Sv^\star_\delta:S\to Svδ⋆​:S→S select maximizers

vδ⋆(v)∈arg⁡max⁡w∈S{ v⋅x(w)−(1−δ) t(w) }.v^\star_\delta(v)\in\arg\max_{w\in S}\bigl\{\,v\cdot x(w)-(1-\delta)\,t(w)\,\bigr\}.vδ⋆​(v)∈argw∈Smax​{v⋅x(w)−(1−δ)t(w)}.

Then for every v∈Sv\in Sv∈S, with v′=vδ⋆(v)v'=v^\star_\delta(v)v′=vδ⋆​(v),

t(v′)  ≥  t(v)−εδ.t(v')\;\ge\;t(v)-\frac{\varepsilon}{\delta}.t(v′)≥t(v)−δε​.

In words: the menu item chosen by type vvv after the payments are discounted by 1−δ1-\delta1−δ charges at most ε/δ\varepsilon/\deltaε/δ less than the item that type was originally assigned. This is the estimate that controls the revenue lost by Nisan's rounding.

Formalization Note The selection vδ⋆v^\star_\deltavδ⋆​ is the map vs, assumed to take values in SSS and to attain the maximum for each v∈Sv\in Sv∈S, as on the page.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ApproxIC_Rounding_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ApproxIC.Rounding

/-- Appendix A, proof of Proposition 1, p. 38: for an ε-IC mechanism `m = (x, t)`, `δ ∈ (0,1)` and
`v′ = v⋆_δ(v) ∈ argmax_{w ∈ S} {v · x(w) − (1 − δ) t(w)}` (the map `vs`), one has
`t(v′) ≥ t(v) − ε/δ` for every `v ∈ S`. -/
theorem payment_loss_bound (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (ε δ : ℝ) (m : Mech)
    (hm : m ∈ Mset M ε) (hδ : δ ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1) (vs : ℝ → ℝ)
    (hvs : ∀ v ∈ Set.Icc 0 M.vbar, vs v ∈ Set.Icc 0 M.vbar ∧
      ∀ w ∈ Set.Icc 0 M.vbar, v * m.x w - (1 - δ) * m.t w ≤ v * m.x (vs v) - (1 - δ) * m.t (vs v)) :
    ∀ v ∈ Set.Icc 0 M.vbar, m.t v - ε / δ ≤ m.t (vs v) := by sorry

end ApproxIC.Rounding
Source
Balseiro, Besbes, Castro, Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility, arXiv:2103.03403v2 (2022), p. 38, Appendix A, proof of Proposition 1, third display
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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