Equation (9), p. 23 — the focal firm's Shapley value φ_F = V + π_F + b/3 + (s^Imp − s^RB)/3
ProvedAlliancePortfolio.Sharing.eq_9alliancescooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1shapley-value
Let be the coalition game of Table 1 on the players : , , , and for every coalition not containing (including ). Let be the Shapley value of in .
Then
This is 's gross payoff in the alliance portfolio; together with (10) it gives the net payoffs from which the knowledge-sharing constraints (11) and Proposition 6 are derived.
Formalization Note The identity holds for all real parameters, so no hypotheses are needed. is the published Shapley value applied to the Table 1 game; the closed form is the content of the theorem.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_ShapleyValue import Definitions.Def_AlliancePortfolio_Sharing_Model
Formal statement
namespace AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
theorem eq_9 (V b πF sImp sRB : ℝ) :
φ V b πF sImp sRB F = V + πF + (1 / 3) * b + (1 / 3) * (sImp - sRB) := by sorry
end AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
Source
Arora, Belenzon & Patacconi, Knowledge sharing in alliances and alliance portfolios, author manuscript of January 24, 2020 (Management Science 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3614), p. 23, equation (9) and footnote 22
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.