p. 24, proof of Lemma 6 — a strategy whose block's matching strategy has probability 0 earns at most maxₛ|μ(s)|
ProvedFixpNash.Blocks.purePayoff_le_of_matching_prob_zeroLet players of a finite game form a block matching-pennies pair (block map , first term , constant , parameter ), and let be any mixed profile (not necessarily an equilibrium). Let be a strategy of whose block corresponds to a strategy of that has probability in , i.e. . Then the expected payoff of for player against the rest of the profile satisfies
In the proof of Lemma 6 this is applied to strategies in a block of maximum probability, whose matching strategies of have probability by the preceding step; the statement here isolates the only property of such blocks that the bound uses.
Formalization Note. is the supremum of over the finite set of pure profiles. The paper's sentence speaks of "any strategy in a block in "; the hypothesis is the general form of it.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Blocks_Form
namespace FixpNash.Blocks
/-- Proof of Lemma 6, p. 24, first payoff bound: for any mixed profile `x`, if the
strategy `β j` of `i'` corresponding to the block of the strategy `j` of `i` has
probability `0`, then the expected payoff of `j` for player `i` against the rest of `x`
is at most `max_s |μ(s)|`. -/
theorem purePayoff_le_of_matching_prob_zero {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{S : ι → Type*} [∀ k, Fintype (S k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (S k)]
(u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (i i' : ι) (β : S i → S i')
(μ : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (n : ℕ) (hG : IsBlockPair u i i' β μ M n)
(x : ∀ k, S k → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x)
(j : S i) (hj : x i' (β j) = 0) :
DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j ≤ ⨆ s : (∀ k, S k), |μ s| := by sorry
end FixpNash.Blocks
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.