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Theorem 2 — F** = F*: equilibrium-feasible and incentive-feasible allocations coincide

Proved
MyersonBargaining.Revelation.equilibrium_feasible_eq_incentive_feasible

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle

Let (C,A1,…,An,U1,…,Un,P)(C,A_1,\dots,A_n,U_1,\dots,U_n,P)(C,A1​,…,An​,U1​,…,Un​,P) be a Bayesian collective choice problem. Let F∗F^*F∗ be the set of allocation vectors V(π)V(\pi)V(π) of Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanisms on the standard response sets, and let F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ be the set of allocation vectors W(π,σ1,…,σn)W(\pi,\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n)W(π,σ1​,…,σn​) where π\piπ is a choice mechanism on any nonempty finite response sets S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​ and (σ1,…,σn)(\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n)(σ1​,…,σn​) is a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ. Then

F∗∗=F∗.F^{**}=F^*.F∗∗=F∗.

For every response-plan equilibrium of every choice mechanism there is a Bayesian incentive-compatible direct mechanism giving every type of every player the same expected payoff, and conversely. So an arbitrator loses no generality by restricting to incentive-compatible mechanisms on the standard response sets.

Formalization Note F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ quantifies over response sets S:ι→S:\iota\toS:ι→ Type with finite nonempty components; fixing Si=AiS_i=A_iSi​=Ai​ would weaken the theorem. Both inclusions are stated.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

theorem equilibrium_feasible_eq_incentive_feasible (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) :
    FStarStar G = MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.FStar G := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 66, Theorem 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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