Theorem 2 — F** = F*: equilibrium-feasible and incentive-feasible allocations coincide
ProvedMyersonBargaining.Revelation.equilibrium_feasible_eq_incentive_feasibleLet be a Bayesian collective choice problem. Let be the set of allocation vectors of Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanisms on the standard response sets, and let be the set of allocation vectors where is a choice mechanism on any nonempty finite response sets and is a response-plan equilibrium for . Then
For every response-plan equilibrium of every choice mechanism there is a Bayesian incentive-compatible direct mechanism giving every type of every player the same expected payoff, and conversely. So an arbitrator loses no generality by restricting to incentive-compatible mechanisms on the standard response sets.
Formalization Note quantifies over response sets Type with finite nonempty components; fixing would weaken the theorem. Both inclusions are stated.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
theorem equilibrium_feasible_eq_incentive_feasible (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) :
FStarStar G = MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.FStar G := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.