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A uniquely successful round pins the honest block at its height (Lemma 14)

Proved
BitcoinBackbone.uniquely_successful_height

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

backbonebitcoinchain-growthchain-qualitycommon-prefixformal-verificationgaray-kiayias-leonardosmathlibnakamoto-consensus

If round iii is uniquely successful with honest miner mmm, then in any valid chain the block at height (base m i).length (0-based index), if honest, is mmm's block of round iii.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinBackbone
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinBackbone.uniquely_successful_height (E : BitcoinBackbone.Execution) (hE : E.Legal)
    (i m : ℕ) (hm : m < E.n) (hmi : E.mined m i = true) (hY : E.Y i = 1)
    (C : BitcoinBackbone.Chain) (hC : E.ValidChain C) (t : ℕ) (ht : t < C.length)
    (hti : t = (E.base m i).length) (q s : ℕ) (h : C[t] = BitcoinBackbone.Block.honest q s) :
    q = m ∧ s = i := by sorry
Source
J. Garay, A. Kiayias, N. Leonardos, The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications, EUROCRYPT 2015 (full version ePrint 2014/765): https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765; Lemmas 7, 14, 15, Theorem 16, the chain-quality theorem; Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: GetBlockProof (chain.cpp) through the block mission's chainWork
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinBackbone.uniquely_successful_height

Statement. Let EEE be an execution of the backbone model, assumed legal (for every ppp, mined(p,0)=false\mathrm{mined}(p,0)=\mathtt{false}mined(p,0)=false; for p<np<np<n, r≥1r\ge1r≥1, base(p,r)\mathrm{base}(p,r)base(p,r) is a valid chain; for p<np<np<n every block of base(p,r)\mathrm{base}(p,r)base(p,r) has round <r<r<r; for p,q<np,q<np,q<n and all rrr, ∣Cq(r)∣≤∣base(p,r+1)∣|\mathcal{C}_q(r)|\le|\mathrm{base}(p,r+1)|∣Cq​(r)∣≤∣base(p,r+1)∣; for j<Zrj<Z_rj<Zr​, advParent(r,j)\mathrm{advParent}(r,j)advParent(r,j) is valid with all blocks of round ≤r\le r≤r). Let i∈Ni\in\mathbb{N}i∈N be a round and m∈Nm\in\mathbb{N}m∈N a party index with:

  • m<nm<nm<n;
  • mined(m,i)=true\mathrm{mined}(m,i)=\mathtt{true}mined(m,i)=true;
  • Yi=1Y_i=1Yi​=1, i.e. the number of party indices p′<np'<np′<n with mined(p′,i)=true\mathrm{mined}(p',i)=\mathtt{true}mined(p′,i)=true is exactly 111 (together with the previous item: mmm is the unique such party).

Let C=[C0,…,Cℓ−1]C=[C_0,\dots,C_{\ell-1}]C=[C0​,…,Cℓ−1​] be a chain that is valid for EEE: for every k<ℓk<\ellk<ℓ, if Ck=honest(p′,r′)C_k=\mathsf{honest}(p',r')Ck​=honest(p′,r′) then p′<np'<np′<n, mined(p′,r′)=true\mathrm{mined}(p',r')=\mathtt{true}mined(p′,r′)=true and base(p′,r′)=[C0,…,Ck−1]\mathrm{base}(p',r')=[C_0,\dots,C_{k-1}]base(p′,r′)=[C0​,…,Ck−1​], while if Ck=adv(r′,j)C_k=\mathsf{adv}(r',j)Ck​=adv(r′,j) then j<Zr′j<Z_{r'}j<Zr′​ and advParent(r′,j)=[C0,…,Ck−1]\mathrm{advParent}(r',j)=[C_0,\dots,C_{k-1}]advParent(r′,j)=[C0​,…,Ck−1​]. Let t∈Nt\in\mathbb{N}t∈N with t<ℓt<\ellt<ℓ and

t  =  ∣base(m,i)∣,t \;=\; |\mathrm{base}(m,i)| ,t=∣base(m,i)∣,

the length of the chain party mmm adopted in round iii. Let q,s∈Nq, s\in\mathbb{N}q,s∈N and suppose the block of CCC at 000-based position ttt is the honest block of party qqq in round sss:

Ct  =  honest(q,s).C_t \;=\; \mathsf{honest}(q,s).Ct​=honest(q,s).

Then q=mq=mq=m and s=is=is=i.

What is and is not assumed. Nothing is assumed about qqq or sss beyond the equation Ct=honest(q,s)C_t=\mathsf{honest}(q,s)Ct​=honest(q,s) (validity of CCC at position ttt entails q<nq<nq<n, mined(q,s)=true\mathrm{mined}(q,s)=\mathtt{true}mined(q,s)=true and base(q,s)=[C0,…,Ct−1]\mathrm{base}(q,s)=[C_0,\dots,C_{t-1}]base(q,s)=[C0​,…,Ct−1​]). CCC is an arbitrary valid chain, not necessarily any party's chain. The round sss of the block is not assumed to be iii; that is part of the conclusion. ttt is a position (number of blocks below the block in question), and the hypothesis identifies it with the length of base(m,i)\mathrm{base}(m,i)base(m,i), which under validity is the position at which honest(m,i)\mathsf{honest}(m,i)honest(m,i) would sit in any valid chain containing it.

Degenerate cases. If i=0i=0i=0 the hypotheses are contradictory, since legality gives mined(m,0)=false\mathrm{mined}(m,0)=\mathtt{false}mined(m,0)=false while mined(m,0)=true\mathrm{mined}(m,0)=\mathtt{true}mined(m,0)=true is assumed; so effectively i≥1i\ge1i≥1. n=0n=0n=0 is excluded by m<nm<nm<n. If t=0t=0t=0 then base(m,i)=[ ]\mathrm{base}(m,i)=[\,]base(m,i)=[] and the claim concerns C0C_0C0​. No typicality hypothesis appears in this theorem.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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