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Lemma 20: equalizing the prices does not increase the SPM revenue

Proved
SeqPostedPricing.PartitionSPM.lemma_20_equal_price_revenue

by mikedeng1 · Oct 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designposted-pricing

Let the agents be indexed in offer order, with offer probabilities c1≥c2≥⋯≥cnc_1 \ge c_2 \ge \cdots \ge c_nc1​≥c2​≥⋯≥cn​, prices p1≥p2≥⋯≥pnp_1 \ge p_2 \ge \cdots \ge p_np1​≥p2​≥⋯≥pn​ and acceptance probabilities qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0. Let pˉ\bar ppˉ​ be the price with

∑ipiqi=pˉ∑iqi.(2)\sum_i p_i q_i = \bar p \sum_i q_i . \tag{2}i∑​pi​qi​=pˉ​i∑​qi​.(2)

Then

∑i=1nci pˉ qi≤∑i=1nci pi qi,\sum_{i=1}^n c_i \,\bar p\, q_i \le \sum_{i=1}^n c_i \, p_i \, q_i ,i=1∑n​ci​pˉ​qi​≤i=1∑n​ci​pi​qi​,

that is, RS≥ReqSR^{\mathcal S} \ge R^{\mathcal S}_{eq}RS≥ReqS​, where ReqSR^{\mathcal S}_{eq}ReqS​ is the revenue of the SPM whose prices all equal pˉ\bar ppˉ​ and which has the same offer probabilities.

It reduces the analysis of S\mathcal SS to an SPM with a single common price.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: R^S ≥ R^S_eq (revenues of two SPMs) → Σ_i c_i p̄ q_i ≤ Σ_i c_i p_i q_i; reason: by the §2.2 formula both revenues are Σ_i c_i (price) q_i with the same offer probabilities c_i, which depend only on the q's
  • generalization: offer probabilities, prices and acceptance probabilities of the SPM S → any non-increasing reals c_i, any non-increasing reals p_i and any q_i ≥ 0; reason: the SPM's c_i are non-increasing and its prices decrease along the order, so it is a special case
  • encoding: agents 1, …, n → Fin n with its order; reason: Lean indexing convention; the same instances
Preamble
import Mathlib
Formal statement
namespace SeqPostedPricing.PartitionSPM

/-- **Lemma 20 (revenue-formula form)** (Chawla, Hartline, Malec, Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, Lemma 20, p. 15 = PDF p. 17): "It is always the case
that R^S ≥ R^S_eq." Here (p. 14, display (2)) `p̄` is the price with `Σ_i p_i q_i = p̄ Σ_i q_i`, and
R^S_eq is the revenue of the SPM whose prices all equal `p̄`; the proof writes
`R^S = Σ_{i=1}^n c_i p_i q_i = Σ_{i=1}^n c_i(p̄ q_i + δ_i) = R^S_eq + Σ c_i δ_i ≥ R^S_eq`.

Agents are indexed in offer order. If the offer probabilities `c_i` are non-increasing, the prices
`p_i` are non-increasing, the acceptance probabilities `q_i` are nonnegative and `p̄` satisfies (2),
then `Σ_i c_i p̄ q_i ≤ Σ_i c_i p_i q_i`.

**Formalization Note** Reading 7 of the mission: by the §2.2 revenue formula both revenues are
`Σ_i c_i (price) q_i` with the same offer probabilities `c_i` (they depend only on the `q`'s), so
the lemma is stated about these sums. The proof's three bullets (c descending; δ single-crossing;
Σ δ = 0) follow from the hypotheses. -/
theorem lemma_20_equal_price_revenue {n : ℕ} (c p q : Fin n → ℝ) (pbar : ℝ)
    (hc : Antitone c) (hp : Antitone p) (hq : ∀ i, 0 ≤ q i)
    (h2 : ∑ i, p i * q i = pbar * ∑ i, q i) :
    ∑ i, c i * (pbar * q i) ≤ ∑ i, c i * p i * q i := by sorry

end SeqPostedPricing.PartitionSPM
Source
Chawla, Hartline, Malec, Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, Lemma 20, p. 15 (PDF p. 17); display (2), p. 14 (PDF p. 16)

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