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Lemma 1 — the overlap term is bounded by a free-lottery term

Proved
ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand.lemma_1

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

consumer-utilitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1probability

Let VVV be a buyer's type with independent coordinates Vj≥0V_j\ge0Vj​≥0, 0<E[Vj]<∞0<\mathbb E[V_j]<\infty0<E[Vj​]<∞, and WWW an independent copy. Let (x,p)(x,p)(x,p) be a truthful, individually rational single-buyer mechanism with nonnegative payments and allocations in [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m, utility uuu, and ex-ante allocation probabilities E[xj(V)]≤qj\mathbb E[x_j(V)]\le q_jE[xj​(V)]≤qj​. For any ℓ1,…,ℓm∈(0,1]\ell_1,\dots,\ell_m\in(0,1]ℓ1​,…,ℓm​∈(0,1],

EV,W[min⁡{u(V),u(W)}]≤EV[max⁡jℓjVj]∑jqjℓj.(3.4)\mathbb E_{V,W}\big[\min\{u(V),u(W)\}\big]\le \mathbb E_V\Big[\max_j\ell_jV_j\Big]\sum_j\frac{q_j}{\ell_j}.\qquad(3.4)EV,W​[min{u(V),u(W)}]≤EV​[jmax​ℓj​Vj​]j∑​ℓj​qj​​.(3.4)

The right side is the utility of the best of the free lotteries ℓj\ell_jℓj​ times a total scaling weight; with (3.3) it gives (3.8).

Differences from the source:

  • reading: a single-buyer mechanism of §3 (unit-demand or constrained-additive; p. 13: the bounds need no unit demand) → any mechanism with x(b) ∈ [0,1]^m, no unit-demand clause; reason: §3 states these bounds for every feasible outcome set F ⊆ [0,1]^m (Theorem 1's setting); unit demand is a special case
  • reading: expectations E[x_j(V)], E[u(V)] of a single-buyer mechanism (rules tacitly measurable) → IsTruthfulIRNPT includes Borel measurability of x and p; reason: the standing convention without which the source's expectations are undefined
  • encoding: values in R_+, laws F_j, items 1..m → ℝ≥0, ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0, Fin m; product law vecLaw; reason: Lean conventions for the same objects
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Model
import Definitions.Def_ConsumerUtilityApprox_UnitDemand_Model
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal
open MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt
Formal statement
namespace ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand

theorem lemma_1 {m : ℕ} (hm : 1 ≤ m) (G : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0)
    (hG : ∀ j, IsValueLaw (G j)) (M : Mechanism (Fin m)) (hM : IsTruthfulIRNPT M)
    (q : Fin m → ℝ) (hq : ∀ j, qAlloc (vecLaw G) M j ≤ q j)
    (ℓ : Fin m → ℝ) (hℓ : ∀ j, 0 < ℓ j ∧ ℓ j ≤ 1) :
    ∫ vw, min (buyerPayoff M vw.1) (buyerPayoff M vw.2) ∂((vecLaw G).prod (vecLaw G))
      ≤ (∫ v, (⨆ j, ℓ j * (v j : ℝ)) ∂(vecLaw G)) * ∑ j, q j / ℓ j := by sorry

end ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand
Source
Goldner, Lundy, Tsilivis, A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer Utility, arXiv:2610.10516 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 94e0dd44…), p. 10, Lemma 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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