Proof of Corollary 1, p. 30 — A(ᾱ, c) − A(α̲, c) is 0 outside ((1−ᾱ)/2, (1+ᾱ)/2), positive inside, rises then falls in c, peak (ᾱ − α̲)/8 at c = 1/2
ProvedInfoBargaining.Uniform.gain_shapecomparative-staticsinformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1uniform-prior
Under the uniform prior, let be the gross surplus gain of maximal over minimal information. Then:
- for with or ;
- for every ;
- for ;
- is strictly increasing on and strictly decreasing on ;
- its peak value is
The marginal value of information is thus largest when the seller's cost equals the prior mean and vanishes when the cost is extreme. This inverted-U shape produces the two cost thresholds of Corollary 1 (ii).
Formalization Note Two printed slips are corrected. The page says the inequality is strict on the closed interval , but by item 1 the gain is at its endpoints, so item 3 uses the open interval. The page gives the peak value as , but , so the peak of is (the factor belongs to ).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform
theorem gain_shape (M : Model) :
(∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1, (c ≤ (1 - M.αhi) / 2 ∨ (1 + M.αhi) / 2 ≤ c) → M.gain c = 0) ∧
(∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1, 0 ≤ M.gain c) ∧
(∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo ((1 - M.αhi) / 2) ((1 + M.αhi) / 2), 0 < M.gain c) ∧
StrictMonoOn M.gain (Set.Icc ((1 - M.αhi) / 2) (1 / 2)) ∧
StrictAntiOn M.gain (Set.Icc (1 / 2) ((1 + M.αhi) / 2)) ∧
M.gain (1 / 2) = (M.αhi - M.αlo) / 8 := by sorry
end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 30, Appendix, proof of Corollary 1, second and third paragraphs
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.