Proposition 2, p. 1003 — returns alone, linear rebates alone or target rebates alone cannot coordinate effort and quantity
ProvedChannelRebate.NoCoord.proposition2_no_single_instrumentLet and (Assumption A1). Demand is , where the retailer's effort is and has a density with on , on (Assumption A4) and finite mean. Effort costs , where and is strictly increasing and strictly convex on (Assumption A5) and differentiable on . Let maximize the integrated channel's profit
over , , with . Write the retailer's profit under wholesale price , rebate per unit sold beyond the target , and return credit per unsold unit as
Then maximizes over , under none of the following contracts:
- returns alone: and any return credit ;
- a linear rebate alone: , any , and no returns ();
- a target rebate alone: any , any , and no returns ().
In each case the retailer's optimal decisions cannot be the integrated channel's, so channel coordination in effort and quantity cannot be achieved. By contrast, the paper's Theorem 2 shows that a target rebate combined with returns can coordinate, and a linear rebate combined with returns coordinates only at , , which leaves the manufacturer no profit.
Formalization Note The existence of the integrated optimum is assumed in the paper in words (p. 999) and is a hypothesis here; its positivity is a disclosed hypothesis, because the paper's optimum is interior (characterized by first-order conditions) and with the channel would sell nothing. Differentiability of on is carried by the effort-cost structure: the paper's argument compares first-order conditions in , and a kink of at could otherwise let both the channel and the retailer stop at . "Not an optimal pair" is stronger than "the retailer's optimum is not unique or not ": it excludes from the retailer's maximizers altogether.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_NoCoord_Setting open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace ChannelRebate.NoCoord
theorem proposition2_no_single_instrument (p c s w : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
(hsc : s < c) (D : Demand) (V : EffortCost)
(Qbar ebar : ℝ) (hopt : ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (chainProfit p c s D V) Qbar ebar) (hebar : 0 < ebar) :
(∀ b : ℝ, s ≤ b → b < w →
¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w 0 b 0 D V) Qbar ebar) ∧
(∀ u : ℝ, 0 < u →
¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w u s 0 D V) Qbar ebar) ∧
(∀ u T : ℝ, 0 < u → 0 ≤ T →
¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w u s T D V) Qbar ebar) := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.NoCoord
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.